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INTRODUCTION

For most of our nation's history, territorial borders have marked
the First Amendment's legal, practical, and theoretical domain. Information flow, whether in the form of persons or materials, and crossborder regulatory schemes have been physical and tangible in nature.
Regulatory power at the borders has been grounded in detention,
exclusion, and search and seizure. Traditional First Amendment theories or justifications have generally assumed that the First Amendment is a wholly domestic concern, one generally impervious to
events, laws, or persons outside U.S. borders.'
Today, however, we live in a world characterized by extraordinary
advances in communications technology, widespread global travel,
increasing cross-border commerce, and frequent transnational
involvements. Information flows at great speed, and in remarkable
quantity, across our national borders. In a "flatter" world, a single
speaker can potentially distribute information in digitized form to millions of people across the world with just a few strokes and clicks.2
Millions of people can and do travel across international borders to
associate with family members and others.3 Journalists share and dis1 See, e.g., Robert D. Kamenshine, Embargoes on Exports of Ideas and Information:
First Amendment Issues, 26 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 863, 865 (1985) ("Most discussions of
first amendment rights assume that the communication is addressed to a domestic
audience or at least assume that the domestic or foreign nature of the audience is
inconsequential.").
2 See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FIAT (2007) (describing how
globalization, fueled by technology, has led to an increasingly interconnected world).
3 In 2008, the U.S. Department of State estimated that sixty-four million trips
were taken overseas by U.S. citizens. U.S. GOV'T AccouNrABLITY OFFICE, Doc. No.
GAO-09-989, WIDE RANGE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES PROVIDED TO AMERICAN CITIZENS
OVERSEAS, BUT IMPROVED MONITORING Is NEEDED 1, (2009), available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d09989.pdf.
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tribute information across the globe.4 The United States, like other
nations, participates in interterritorial agreements, tribunals, and
processes. Today, the First Amendment increasingly competes and
often conflicts with the speech, privacy, and association laws of other
nations.5 Globalization, digitization, and other modern forces fundamentally alter the premise that the First Amendment is solely or principally a domestic concern bounded by territory.
The relationship between territory and the First Amendment has
become more complicated. But what precisely is that relationship? In
a digitized and globalized speech environment, to what extent can or
does the United States continue to rely upon a territorially based regulatory model with respect to the cross-border flow of information?
How "open" are our borders in terms of speech and association, both
as a matter of law and, with the advent of the Web and other communications technologies, practically speaking? Is the First Amendment
a set of domestic limitations or a universal human right that applies
without regard to borders? Scholars have devoted far less effort to systematically analyzing the intersection of territorial borders and the
First Amendment than they have to various domestic doctrines and
concerns. What is immediately apparent is that we do not have a single, unitary First Amendment. Rather, we have at least three First
Amendments: the intraterritorial, the territorial, and the
extraterritorial.
The intraterritorialFirst Amendment affects speech and association within U.S. territorial borders and in U.S. territories. There is
substantial intraterritorial uniformity with regard to speech and association rights, owing in part to the supremacy of the First Amendment.
But inside the United States and its territories, speech and association
rights still vary depending on one's status and geographic location.
For instance, noncitizens may enjoy lesser First Amendment rights in
certain circumstances than citizens, 6 different community norms may

4 See generally LEE C.

BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED,

ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN:

A

FREE

68-107 (2010) (discussing the future of the press and freedom of speech in today's era of "new technologies of communication and
globalization").
5 See, e.g., John Schwartz, Two German Killers DemandingAnonymity Sue Wikipedia's
Parent,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at Al3 (reporting that German ex-convicts' attempt
to enforce a German privacy law against a U.S. business conflicts with the First
Amendment).
6 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952) (rejecting
Fifth and First Amendment challenges of resident aliens deported on the ground that
they had once been members of the Communist Party).
PRESS FOR A NEW CENTURY
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be used to assess whether sexually explicit speech is obscene, 7 and
some states provide for more robust speech rights than the First
Amendment mandates as a floor.8
The territorial First Amendment refers to the vast regulatory
scheme that affects cross-border speech and association. With whom
may American speakers legally interact? What information may they
share across territorial borders? What may foreign speakers convey
across our borders? The contours of the territorial First Amendment
are shaped by national security concerns, the federal government's
plenary powers with regard to immigration and customs, and the deference generally given by courts to the national government's exercise
of foreign relations powers. Simply put, the First Amendment has
long operated very differently at the nation's borders.
Finally, the extraterritorialFirst Amendment refers to application
of First Amendment restrictions outside U.S. territorial borders and
the scope or domain of speech-protective First Amendment principles, standards, and norms. Is the First Amendment merely a domestic limitation, or is it a universal human right? Does the First
Amendment follow the flag, or stop at the water's edge?
Although the issues raised by the intraterritorial First Amendment are important and sometimes overlap with other territorial concerns, this Article will focus primarily on the territorial and
extraterritorial First Amendments. The primary concern will be the
legislative, executive, and judicial treatment of what might generally
be referred to as the First Amendment's "non-domestic" dimension.
Part I examines the territorial First Amendment, which defines
the legal scope of speech and associational liberties at international
borders and their functional equivalents. As we shall see, the formal
core of the territorial First Amendment has remained remarkably stable over time. Today, as in the past, foreign scholars and other speakers have no constitutional right to cross U.S. borders to convey
information or associate with U.S. audiences. The government may
deny access to foreign speakers so long as it has a "facially legitimate
7 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 33 (1973) (explaining that obscenity is
to be judged according to contemporary community standards).
8 In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Supreme Court
held that "a state's organic and general law can independently furnish a basis for
protecting individual rights of speech and assembly." State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615,
624 (N.J. 1980) (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81). Some states have mandated
greater access to private properties than the First Amendment floor requires. See, e.g.,
N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 777 (N.J.
1994) (holding that private shopping centers are required to allow leafleting and
associated expressive activities on their premises).
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and bona fide reason" for doing so.9 Current federal laws and regulations may also permit officials to exclude foreign speakers on solely
ideological grounds, a feature of cross-border information control
that dates to the late 17 90s. Moreover, federal law prohibits foreign
nationals from making direct contributions in U.S. elections'o and
limits distribution of "foreign political propaganda" inside the United
States.I
Citizens' cross-border speech is also limited in various respects.
For example, the Logan Act, enacted in 1799, criminalizes unauthorized "correspondence or intercourse" with foreign governments.12
Although international travel is now commonplace, federal laws and
regulations still place restrictions on travel to certain areas of the
world. Federal law now prohibits denial or revocation of a passport
based upon ideological or expressive grounds.' 3 But the First Amendment does not proscribe restrictions on territorial egress even if the
purpose of the proposed travel is to engage in expressive, journalistic,
or associative activities.14
At U.S. territorial borders, federal officials retain broad authority
to search expressive materials. Prior to and during the Cold War, customs and border laws were enforced to restrict or prohibit the importation and exportation of films, books, and magazines.' 5 For a variety
of reasons, the regulatory focus has shifted to the cross-border flow of
technological data and information, particularly as these relate to
materials that may have military applications.' 6 Broad customs
authority has been extended to laptops and other computing devices
which are filled with personal data and other expressive materials,

9 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
10 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006).
11 22 U.S.C. § 614 (2006).
12 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006).
13 See 22 U.S.C. § 2721 (providing that passports cannot be denied or revoked on
basis of speech, belief, affiliation, or membership).
14 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (upholding Cuba travel restrictions).
15 See Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National
Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719, 728-34 (1985) (describing
cross-border speech and association restrictions).
16 As some scholars have noted, U.S. authorities have altered enforcement strategies to account for the digitization and cross-border sharing of information via the
Internet. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?
(2006) (arguing that the Internet has not diminished the authority or relevance of
national governments and that territorial governance remains the norm).
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such as medical records, diaries, and photographs.' 7 Courts have
refused to apply a First Amendment "exception" to these border
searches.1 8 Finally, various laws restrict the ability of U.S. citizens and
resident aliens to maintain contact and associate, both domestically
and abroad, with foreign missions and other organizations.
Although the core of the territorial First Amendment remains
largely intact, Part I shows that territorial borders are not the strong
regulatory barriers to cross-border information flow that they once
were. In the mid-1980s, some were bemoaning the existence of a
"nylon curtain" of federal laws and regulations that operated as an
ideological barrier at the nation's borders.19 During the past two
decades or so, territorial borders have been transformed from relatively hard to much softer barriers. As we shall see, although the
courts have played some role in terms of territorial liberalization, the
most important actors have been legislative and executive officials.
Formal ideological barriers, in particular, have nearly disappeared.
More generally, legal and regulatory amendments have facilitated the
cross-border flow of a variety of informational materials. The gradual
lifting of travel barriers has also increased cross-border association
and inquiry. In addition to various legal and regulatory changes, digitization and globalization have fundamentally changed the practice
and governance of cross-border information flow. In combination,
these legal and social forces have altered the territorial framework
that has traditionally governed speech, press, and associational liberties. Although we do not have open borders insofar as information
flow is concerned, the First Amendment is far less territorial than perhaps at any time in our nation's history.
Part II examines the extraterritorial First Amendment. Extraterritoriality consists of two basic elements. The first element of extraterritoriality relates to exportation of First Amendment norms,
principles, and standards. First Amendment exportation has long
been part of our nation's domestic and foreign policies. For example,
some U.S. laws apply to foreign speech owing to its domestic effects.
17 Rasha Alzahabi, Note, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home when Traveling
Abroad?: The Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L. REV.
161, 185 (2008).
18 See infra Part I.C.
19 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 720 (lamenting that the U.S. border
has become "a serious barrier to free trade in ideas"); see also Brad R. Roth, The First
Amendment in the Foreign Affairs Realm: "Domesticating"the Restrictions on Citizen Participation, 2 TEMP. POL. & Cv. RTs. L. REv. 255, 256 (1993) (criticizing various limitations,
including immigration and travel restrictions, on citizen participation in foreign
affairs).
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Moreover, through a variety of means, including funding decisions,
proposed restrictions on the forms of assistance that domestic technology companies may provide to speech-repressive regimes abroad,
and efforts to enshrine First Amendment press and expressive freedoms in international agreements, the United States has historically
characterized and sought to position the First Amendment as a universal human right. In the latest instance, courts and legislatures have
refused to grant recognition to and enforce foreign libel judgments
on the ground that they were obtained pursuant to foreign speech
laws that lack First Amendment protections. In sum, policymakers
have long recognized and supported an extraterritorial First
Amendment.
The second element is the extraterritorial application of First
Amendment limitations. With regard to citizens, although First
Amendment rights have not frequently been enforced extraterritorially the assumption is that the First Amendment formally applies to
expressive activities beyond U.S. borders.2 0 By contrast, aliens abroad
are presumed not to enjoy First Amendment rights. Thus, although
they favor exportation of First Amendment norms in general, policymakers have been reluctant to acknowledge that First Amendment
limitations apply extraterritorially.
Part III synthesizes the territorial and extraterritorial dimensions
and reconsiders the modern relationship between territorial borders
and First Amendment liberties. As noted, the First Amendment is certainly less territorial as a result of recent political and judicial judgments. That trend is likely to continue. As policymakers continue to
recognize that Americans' informational, commercial, educational,
cultural, and artistic interests do not stop at the water's edge, the First
Amendment will continue to become more cosmopolitan in character. Political and judicial interpretations of free speech, press, and
association guarantees will embrace and facilitate the cross-border
flow of information. Although territorial governance remains intactand likely will so long as there are states-governments will also likely
continue to experience diminished capacity to control cross-border
information flow. In the globalized and digitized era, the most important First Amendment questions will likely relate to the First Amendment's extraterritorial domain. The First Amendment may become
more cosmopolitan in this realm as well, in terms of its influence
20 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (assuming arguendo that the First
Amendment applies overseas); see also Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir.
1991) (concluding that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause "should apply
extraterritorially").
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beyond U.S. borders. However, the United States obviously cannot
unilaterally export First Amendment norms and principles abroad.
Moreover, courts are likely to remain hesitant to expand First Amendment guarantees beyond U.S. borders. Indeed there are constitutional, diplomatic, theoretical, and other obstacles to further
expansion of the extraterritorial First Amendment. But these are not
insurmountable. The contours of the extraterritorial First Amendment are still developing, and there are avenues for further expansion. Of course, extraterritoriality may work in more than one
direction. Legal, social, and political forces may bring foreign speech
regimes to U.S. shores. Hence the First Amendment may also become
cosmopolitan in the sense that it must compete with and may be influenced by other speech regimes. The question is whether, as a result,
the First Amendment will lose some of its exclusive and exceptional
intraterritorial domain.
I.

THE TERRITORIAL FIRST AMENDMENT

This Part describes the current state of our territorial First
Amendment. The basic foundation or infrastructure of the territorial
First Amendment was put in place during the early days of the Republic. Since that time, officials have exercised the power to exclude and
remove aliens and to control the import and export of informational
materials. The territorial First Amendment has not received sustained
attention during the past two decades.2 1 During that period, however,
there have been significant legal, political, and social changes with
regard to cross-border speech, press, and association. Foreign persons, influences, and ideas have given rise to numerous territorial
restrictions, from ideological immigration exclusion laws to limits on
the importation of foreign films and magazines. Although it has not
disappeared, fear of foreign persons and ideas has dissipated somewhat over time. Indeed in today's globalized society, many citizens
eagerly seek out foreign news, ideas, and contacts. As we shall see, in
many respects cross-border channels of communication are more
open today than at any time in our nation's history. Thus, while the
basic territorial framework remains in place numerous fissures have
appeared in its foundation. The broader implications of these developments will be addressed in Part III.
21 The most comprehensive treatment of the subject of restrictions on cross-border speech and association appears in a 1985 article by Burt Neuborne and Steven
Shapiro. See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15; see also Roth, supra note 19 (examining certain restrictions affecting citizen participation in foreign affairs).
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TerritorialExclusion-Ingress

The territorial First Amendment limits domestic access to foreign
persons, ideas, and materials in a number of ways. There is, of course,
no absolute right to speak to and associate with foreign audiences or
to gather information from abroad. Persons and materials can be
stopped at the international border or its functional equivalent,
searched, and seized for a variety of reasons. For lawful entry, persons
and physical materials must cross at designated immigration and customs checkpoints. Lawful material that finds its way onto U.S. soil
must be made freely accessible. Thus, for example, the Supreme
Court has held that the U.S. Post Office cannot refuse to deliver legal
foreign propaganda materials to a domestic addressee absent her
affirmative request. 2 2
The right to see, hear, and associate with a foreign speaker on
U.S. soil depends entirely upon the speaker's ability to (lawfully) gain
entry into the United States.23 The sovereign is entitled to control
access to its territory. Control over international borders includes the
basic power to determine who may enter.2 4 As a matter of territorial
sovereignty, most if not all nation-states exercise some degree of control over the ingress of aliens. 25 The grounds for denial of entry vary.
In many countries, including some Western democracies, it is rather
common for speakers to be denied entry or excluded based solely
upon ideological concerns. Britain, Canada, and South Africa all have
recently refused entry to speakers based upon their public statements
26
regarding, respectively, Islam, terrorist organizations, and Tibet.
22 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (holding that a Post
Office requirement that required an addressee to affirmatively request receipt of foreign communist political propaganda abridged the First Amendment).
23 The unlawful entrant may, of course, be removed from the United States thus
terminating the association.
24 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (discussing relationship
between political membership and territorial borders); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) ("Admission of aliens to the United States is a
privilege granted by the sovereign . . . .").

25 See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SovEREIcNrY: ORGANIZED HYPocIUsY 12 (1999)
(describing this conception of sovereignty as "interdependence sovereignty"). The
United States, like other nations, also exercises the power of removal. This is a matter
that relates primarily to what I have referred to as the "intraterritorial" First
Amendment.
26 Seejohn F. Bums, Britain Refuses Entry to Dutch Lawmaker Whose Remarks and Film
Have Angered Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A8 (reporting that British authorities had barred the entry of an alleged anti-Muslim lawmaker); Celia W. Dugger, South
Aftica Bars Dalai Lama from a Peace Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at A10
(reporting that the Dalai Lama was barred from a conference because his presence
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British officials have published a master list of those excluded from
entering the country, in part to demonstrate to the world the nation's
"values and standards."2 7 These and other nations typically cite concerns regarding national security and other broad public interests as
the bases for territorial exclusions.
The United States has excluded or removed alien persons, often
for purely ideological reasons, throughout its history. Reflecting a
deep-seated fear of foreign ideas and influences, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 179828 authorized the President to remove any alien considered dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.2 9 To
this day, the President is granted authority to remove citizens of
enemy nations, without so much as a pre-removal hearing.3 0
In addition to imposing racial restrictions, early immigration laws
imposed blanket exclusions on classes of aliens who were believed to
espouse certain ideologies and to be involved in disfavored associations.31 From World War I through the end of the Cold War, Congress authorized visa denials, immigration exclusions, and
deportations of anarchists and Communists, and other persons
deemed a threat to the interests and security of the United States.32
During the Cold War, the United States became a closed and
insular society in certain respects. The national mood was unmistakably manifested at the borders, which were closed to foreign ideologies
like communism and socialism. Section 212(a) (27) of the McCarranwould not be in South Africa's "best interests"); Robert Mackey, Canada Bars
'Infandous' British Politician,journalists Reach for Dictionaries, LEDE: N.Y. TIMES NEws
BLOC, Mar. 20, 2009, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/canada-bars(reporting that Canainfandous-british-politician-journalists-reach-for-dictionaries/
dian officials had barred the entry of a member of the British Parliament who had
allegedly openly supported Hamas).
27 John F. Burns, BritainIdentifies 16 People Barredfrom Entering the Country in the
Past 6 Months, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A6.
28 Act ofJuly 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801); Act ofJuly 6, 1798, ch.
66, 1 Stat. 577 (expired 1801); Act ofJune 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800);
Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802).
29 See Act of June 25, 1798, § 1, 1 Stat. at 570-71.
30 See 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006). Fear of foreign influence extends to U.S. campaign
laws. Federal campaign finance laws currently prohibit foreign nationals from making direct contributions in federal, state, and local elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006).
31 See, e.g., Alien Immigration Act, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 (1903).
32 See, e.g., Anarchist Act of 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (authorizing the removal
of alien anarchists); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952) (rejecting a
First Amendment challenge to a law providing for the deportation of communists);
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1904) (upholding the
removal of an alien anarchist).
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Walter Act,33 enacted in 1952 over President Truman's veto, authorized exclusion of aliens who sought to enter the United States "solely,
principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States."3 4 Section 212(a) (28) of the McCarranWalter Act authorized purely ideological exclusions of "anarchists"
and communist affiliates.3 5 From 1952 through the late 1970s,
thousands of aliens were deemed excludable under section
212 (a) (28) based principally or solely upon ideological grounds, forcing them to seek waivers from the Attorney General in order to enter
the country. 3 6 During this period, State Department and immigration
officials excluded numerous foreign scholars, artists, and musicians
under the McCarran-Walter Act's ideological exclusion provisions.3 7
These enactments assumed, of course, that ideological exclusions
were valid under the First Amendment. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,3 the
Supreme Court held that aliens have no First Amendment right to
enter the country to convey ideas or information, or to associate with
domestic persons and entities.3 9 The Court also held, however, that
audiences within the United States possess a First Amendment right to
receive information from foreign speakers. 4 0 That includes, said the
Mandel Court, the right "'to have the alien enter and to hear him
explain and seek to defend his views.' "4 1 In a portion of the opinion
that may come to have particular salience in the digital era, the Court
noted that the mere possibility that the message could be delivered by
means other than face-to-face interaction with the speaker did not satisfy First Amendment concerns. 4 2
33 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)).
34 Id. § 212(a) (27), 66 Stat. at 184 (repealed 1990).
35 Id. § 212(a)(28)(A)-(C), 66 Stat. at 184-85 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (3) (D)).
36 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 723.
37 SeeJohn A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the McCarran-WalterAct, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1481, 1496-97 (1988) (discussing the
effect of ideological deportation and exclusion on the academy and on academic freedom); Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents,
100 HARv. L. REv. 930, 935, 940-41 (1987) (discussing ideological exclusions).
38 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
39 Id. at 767-68.
40 Id. at 769; see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (recognizing a right to receive information).
41 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 764-65 (quoting Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 631

(E.D.N.Y. 1971)).
42

Id. at 765.
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Although it recognized domestic audiences' right to hear or
receive, the Mandel Court made clear that visa denials and exclusions
are not to be judged according to ordinary First Amendment standards. Rather, said the Court, in this context the government is only
required to provide a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the
exclusion. 4 3 According to the Court, this standard acknowledges the
government's plenary authority with regard to entry into the United
States.44 As scholars have noted, Mandel"raises as many questions as it
answers."45 It appears that the government is required to at least provide some basis or explanation for its exclusion. But it remains
unclear, even today, whether the First Amendment prohibits the government from excluding an alien from the United States based solely
upon ideological grounds. 4 6
In the late 1970s, the political branches repealed the more blatant ideological barriers to entry. The McGovern Amendment, 4 7
enacted in 1977, restricted the government's ability to exclude suspected Communists or anarchists under section 212(a) (28) of the
McCarran-Walter Act.48 In a 1987joint conference report, moreover,
Congress concluded that the executive branch had misused section
212(a) (28) to exclude noncitizens based solely upon their ideology.4 9
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration then turned to section
212(a) (27) of the Act, which, as noted, allowed for exclusion when
aliens' activities in the United States would be "prejudicial to the public interest."5 0 Many foreign officials and scholars were denied visas
under this provision. 5 1 As several court decisions from the 1980s
showed, the phrase "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" was not
43 Id. at 770.
44 Id. at 768-69; see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585-92 (1952)
(upholding the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which barred the entry of aliens who
advocated for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government or associated with others
who did so, against a First Amendment challenge). For a critical analysis of the government's interests in ideological exclusion, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO
THE CONSTITUTION 152-61 (1996).
45 Shapiro, supra note 37, at 936.
46 See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 ("What First Amendment or other grounds may be
available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is
advanced is a question we neither address nor decide in this case.").
47 Pub. L. No. 95-105, 91 Stat. 844 (1977) (repealed 1990).
48 Id. § 112, 91 Stat. at 848.
49 H.R. REP. No. 100-475, at 162-63 (1987) (Conf. Rep.).
50 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a) (27), 66 Stat.
163, 184 (repealed 1990); see also Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 726-27
(describing Reagan administration exclusions).
51 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 726-27.
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particularly helpful in resolving the scope of the government's authority to engage in ideological exclusion. 5 2
53
In 1990, Congress passed the Moynihan-Frank Amendment,
which expressly prohibited the deportation or exclusion of noncitizens "because of the alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations
would be lawful within the United States." 54 With that amendment,
the United States eliminated a significant ideological territorial barrier.5 5 Absent a clear constitutional mandate, however, Congress was
of course always free to change course.
Indeed, when concerns regarding terrorism mounted in the late
1990s, Congress enacted new territorial exclusion provisions. In 1996,
Congress delegated to the State Department the authority to exclude
"representative[s]" and "member[s]" of terrorist organizations.56
Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress imposed additional restrictions on entry.5 7 The war on terrorism is, in part, a war of
ideas and ideology. Thus, it should not be surprising that affiliation
with terrorist causes and groups has become a possible ground for
52 Compare El-Werfalli v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (concluding that Mandel does not permit courts to probe the wisdom or basis of proffered
reasons for exclusion), with Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (D. Mass. 1985)
(holding that mere membership in an organization alleged to be a communist-front
association was not a sufficient statutory basis for denial under the McCarran-Walter
Act), and Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 887 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the
government lacks authority to exclude an alien under section 212(a)(27) of the
McCarran-Walter Act based solely on a proposed message), vacated, 785 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
53 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.
54 Id. § 601, 104 Stat. at 5071. Immigration laws were generally amended in the
1990s to limit excludable offenses primarily to conduct rather than speech or ideology. For example, current immigration laws make a person who has engaged in terrorist activities ineligible for certain visas. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2006).
Ineligibility may be waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security at the recommendation of the State Department. See 22 C.F.R. § 40.301 (2009).
55 Immigration laws continue to grant officials discretion to exclude aliens based
upon "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(C)(i).
56 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 411, 110 Stat. 1214, 1268-69 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006)).
57 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 22, 28, 31, 42,
49, and 50 U.S.C.) (imposing more restrictive rules on the immigration of suspected
terrorists).

1556

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:4

exclusion. A provision of the USA PATRIOT Act5 8 permits the
Department of Homeland Security to bar from the United States any
alien that has used a "position of prominence within any country to
endorse or espouse terrorist activity."59 The U.S. State Department
has interpreted this provision to authorize exclusion of aliens based
upon "irresponsible expressions of opinion by prominent aliens who
are able to influence the actions of others."60 The REAL ID Act of
200561 rendered aliens excludable on the same substantive grounds,
regardless of whether they held a "position of prominence" in their
home countries.62
The extent to which federal officials have relied upon the
"endorse or espouse" provision is unclear. Civil libertarians claim that
during the past several years "dozens" of scholars, journalists, and
other putative speakers have been excluded based solely upon ideological grounds.6 3 In some cases, however, it appears that either no
explanation for the exclusion was given or the government purported
to rely upon other provisions of federal law to deny entry. This was
true, for example, in two recent high-profile cases involving scholars
denied entry to the United States.6 4 In one case, the government initially failed to provide any reason for the exclusion.6 5 In the other,
although the government initially appeared to rely upon the USA
PATRIOT and REAL ID exclusion provisions, it later asserted that the
alien scholar was barred under laws prohibiting entry to those who
give financial support to known terrorist organizations. 66
The executive branch has consistently asserted that it has the
authority to engage in ideological exclusion. An appellate brief filed
58 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 12, 15, 18, 22, 28, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
59 Id. § 411(a)(1)(A), 115 Stat. at 345-46.
60 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANuAL § 40.32 at n.6.2(3) (2005).
61 Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C.).
62 See id. § 103(a), 119 Stat. at 306-07.
63 Am. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE EXCLUDED 8 (2007), available at http://www.
aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/the-excluded-report.pdf.
64 See Am. Sociological Ass'n v. Chertoff, 588 F. Supp. 2d 166, 172-73 (D. Mass.
2008) (ordering the government to provide some specific basis for exclusion); Am.
Acad. of Religion v. Chertoff, No. 06 CV 588(PAC), 2007 WL 4527504, at *15-16
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007) (finding that alien was excluded not under PATRIOT Act's
"endorse or espouse" provision, but on basis of donations made to organizations supporting known terrorist groups), vacated sub nom. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009).
65 See Am. Sociological Ass'n, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
66 See Am. Acad. of Religion, 2007 WL 4527504, at *3-4.
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by the George W. Bush administration claimed that Congress may
constitutionally exclude persons based solely upon ideology, beliefs,
or memberships. 6 7 The Obama administration has been urged to
renounce and disclaim this authority but has thus far refused to do
so. 6 8 That does not mean, however, that the administration is currently engaging in ideological exclusion. Indeed in two recent cases,
the Obama administration lifted bans on prominent Muslim scholars
who had been denied entry visas by the previous administration. 6 9
Whatever other constitutional ambiguities it may contain, Mandel
reaffirmed Congress's longstanding power "'to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country."'70 Like other
nations, the United States continues to exercise this broad sovereign
power. As recently as the 1980s, the federal government frequently
engaged in ideological exclusions. 7 ' Changes to immigration laws,
some enacted in furtherance of international commitments to facilitate cross-border information flow, have denied the executive branch
general authority to exclude aliens based solely upon ideology.7 2
Moreover, recent administrations have seemed reluctant to rely upon
any supposed authority in the USA PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts to
exclude aliens based solely upon their beliefs or associations. Future
administrations will undoubtedly face pressure to exclude aliens based
upon their associations and beliefs. For now, whether the territorial
First Amendment permits the government to deny domestic audiences an opportunity to hear or associate with an alien in person
based solely upon what she has to say remains an open question.
B.

Travel Restrictions-Egress

Visiting with alien speakers is of course not the only way to gather
information and share ideas with foreigners. For scholars, politicians,
artists, and many others, cross-border travel is a significant avenue of
communication and information gathering.
67 See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 52-59, Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-0826-CV).
68 John Schwartz, U.S. Is Urged to Lift Antiterror Ban on Foreign Scholars, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2009, at A19.
69 Sarah Lyall, In Shift, U.S. Lifts Visa Curbs on Professor,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010,
at A6.
70 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895)).
71 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 726-27.
72 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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Although it is difficult to imagine, early in our nation's history
the federal government did not formally or systematically regulate foreign travel. Prior to World War I, international travel from the United
States was regulated pursuant to a set of ad hoc and informal practices
involving the State Department's authority to grant or deny passports.75 During World War I, Congress enacted the first law prohibiting foreign travel without a valid passport. 74 After the war, the State
Department imposed certain geographic limits on travel under U.S.
passports.7 5 Ideological restrictions on travel were common during
certain historical periods. During the Cold War, in particular, State
Department officials frequently prevented American communists
from traveling abroad.7 6 Prominent Americans who were denied passports during the McCarthy era included Arthur Miller, Paul Robeson,
and Linus Pauling.7 7
In the late 1970s, Congress substantially revised executive authority with respect to foreign travel. The 1978 Amendment to the Passport Act 7 8 prohibited executive officials from unilaterally imposing
area restrictions on travel, except during certain declared emergencies.7 9 But laws and regulations imposing economic sanctions and
trade embargoes have often acted as de facto international travel
bans. In the 1980s, for example, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations that treated a host of expenditures related to travel
to Cuba as prohibited economic transactions.s0 Depending on the
nature and number of expenditures covered, these sorts of regulations can effectively create a travel ban with respect to the disfavored
nations. The principal goal of such trade embargoes, which currently
apply to several nations, is to isolate targeted countries economically
and to deprive them of the benefit of U.S. dollars. The embargoes
also further diplomatic interests. The First Amendment speech, press,
and association costs of these measures can be quite substantial, inso73 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 734-35 (discussing the history of
limitations on foreign travel).
74 See Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, §§ 1-2, 40 Stat. 559, 559.
75 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 734.
76 See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 501-02 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 117-20 (1958).
77 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 739.
78 Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 963 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 211a).
79 Id. § 124, 92 Stat. at 971. Today, area restrictions may only be imposed with
the acquiescence of Congress pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2006).
80 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2009) (listing restricted activities and expenses
relating to travel to Cuba); see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242-43 (1984) (holding that Cuba travel restrictions do not violate the right to travel abroad).

20101

TERRITORIALITY AND

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1559

far as citizens and resident aliens wish to travel abroad for expressive,
journalistic, academic, or associative purposes.
The First Amendment arguably places greater constraints on the
government's control over citizens' territorial egress than it does on
ingress from foreign nations. In contrast to foreign aliens, of course,
U.S. citizens possess First and Fifth Amendment rights. In reviewing
passport revocations and denials, the Supreme Court has grudgingly
assumed that "First Amendment protections reach beyond our
national boundaries."8 1 The Court has also recognized that the freedom to travel abroad "is a constitutional liberty closely related to
rights of free speech and association."8 2 It has acknowledged that foreign travel is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.8 3 The Court has not, however, recognized any fundamental
First Amendment right to travel abroad.8 4
The Court has held that the First Amendment is implicated when
a citizen's right to travel abroad is expressly conditioned upon the
surrender of First Amendment rights.8 5 Nevertheless, First Amendment liberties are not as robust at the territorial borders as they are
within the United States.8 6 For example, the First Amendment protects a U.S. citizen who wishes to travel from California to New York to
study and write about New York City's culture. In contrast, the
Supreme Court has held that a citizen's mere desire to travel for purposes of gathering information does not implicate significant First

81 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981).
82 Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964).
83 See id. (noting the connection between the First Amendment and international
travel).
84 Kamenshine, supra note 1, at 893.
85 See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 507 (holding that the denial of a passport on the basis
of communist affiliation violates the Fifth Amendment and that First Amendment
interests could not be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel could be exercised
by relinquishment of affiliation with the organization); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
130 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of State lacked authority to refuse the issuance
of a passport on the basis of alleged beliefs, associations, or ideological matters). The
Court has expressly recognized a Fifth Amendment liberty interest in traveling
abroad. See id. at 125 ("The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.").
86 The issue is territorialrather than intraterritorialowing to the fact that the traveler, while presently located within the United States, seeks to cross the territorial
border. She is free to move up until the time she encounters the border. In contrast,
the alien subject to deportation is presently located on U.S. soil and is subject to
discharge against her will to some other territory.
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Amendment concerns.8 7 It has also held that the government may
restrict foreign travel when a speaker's conduct or speech may pose a
threat to foreign diplomacy or national security.8 8 The President may
also prohibit travel in national emergencies, as President George W.
Bush did in 2003 with respect to travel to Iraq, without running afoul
of the First Amendment.8 9
Although the United States has historically exercised significant
control over its citizens' territorial egress, including enforcement of
some ideological barriers, in recent decades the federal government
has not placed substantial restrictions on foreign travel. Indeed, today
there are very few international travel restrictions in place. None of
the existing restrictions are formally or explicitly grounded solely on
ideological concerns. In 1991, Congress specified as impermissible
bases for passport denial, revocation, or restriction "any speech, activity, belief, affiliation, or membership, within or outside the United
States, which, if held or conducted within the United States, would be
protected by the first amendment."9 0
Although the State Department warns against travel to certain
countries, such as North Korea and Iran, the government does not
enforce an outright travel ban with respect to these or any other
nations.9 ' The recent trend has been to lift or liberalize general travel
bans. For example, a ban on travel to Libya was lifted in 2004.92 Further, the Obama administration has recently granted a general license
87 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); see also Freedom to Travel Campaign v.
Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Cuba travel restrictions
did not implicate the First Amendment).
88 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981) (upholding the denial of a passport to person who engaged in repeated disclosures of intelligence operations and
names of intelligence personnel). The Agee Court concluded that the denial was
based in part on the putative traveler's conduct and that any speech involved was not
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 308-09.
89 See Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 559 F.3d 595, 605 (7th Cir.
2009) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the imposition of sanctions on a
person who traveled to Iraq to act as a "human shield," on the ground that sanctions
applied to conduct rather than speech).
90 22 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006). Not all associational grounds have been eliminated
from the immigration exclusion provisions. For example, an alien who is an officer,
official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is
deemed excludable on the ground of participation in terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a) (3) (B) (i) (2006).
91 However, citizens travel to some of these places at their peril. See Choe SangHun, North Korea Says It Is Holding Two American TV Reporters, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22,
2009, at A13.
92 Fred Barbash & Peter Slevin, U.S. Lifts Ban on Travel to Libya, WASH. PosT, Feb.
27, 2004, at Al6.
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for travel to Cuba to all U.S. citizens with "close relatives" there.9 3
This will obviously facilitate "intimate" association outside U.S. territory.9 4 Bipartisan legislation recently introduced in the House of Representatives would lift all remaining restrictions on travel to and
expenditures in Cuba. 95 The Obama administration also recently
lifted a twenty-two year ban on entry into the United States by H.I.V.positive people, a decision that will allow international AIDS researchers and activists to meet in the United States. 9 6 The emerging trend,
at least during the past decade or so, has favored liberalization of
cross-border travel. This is important not only to economic opportunities abroad, but to cross-border information sharing and association
as well.
Existing regulations concerning economic embargoes and foreign travel expenditures are also relatively permissive, particularly
with regard to travel for speech, information-gathering, academic, and
other expressive purposes. For example, current federal regulations
regarding travel to Cuba, which at this point remains subject to a
trade embargo, allow for the issuance of general or specific licenses to
scholars, professionals, journalists, and others.9 7 Specific licenses may
also be granted for travel relating to familial obligations, religious
activities, humanitarian projects, and cultural performances or exhibitions.98 The list of travelers eligible for general or specific licenses has
steadily expanded in recent years, with specific regard for press, academic, and expressive activities.
Of course, the requirement that citizens and resident aliens
obtain a license to engage in cross-border expressive activities can
itself be a substantial restriction, one that would be an invalid prior
93

OFFICE

OF FOREIGN

ASSETS

CONTROL, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,

IMPLEMENTATION OF CUBA TRAVEL AND TRADE-RELATED

GUIDANCE ON

PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS

Acr, 2009, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/programs/cuba/omni-guide.pdf; see Omnibus Appropriations
Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 621, 123 Stat. 524, 678 (directing the Treasury Department to defund certain travel restrictions); see also William E. Gibson, More Cuba Trips
Expected, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A20 (suggesting that the Obama administration
may lift the Cuba travel embargo).
94 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (recognizing "intimate" and "expressive" associations).
95 See Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act, H.R. 874, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Liza
Gross, Bill Aims to End Cuba Travel Ban, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 2009, at 7A.
96 Julia Preston, Obama Lifts a 22-Year Ban on Entry into U.S. by H.I.V.-PositivePeople,
APPROPRIATIONS

N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2009, at A9.

97 See 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.560(a) (1)-(12) (2009) (providing for general and specific
licenses for a variety of individuals and organizations).
98 See id. §§ 515.561, 515.566, 515.575, 515.567.
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restraint if enforced within U.S. borders. Moreover, despite recent
liberalization, current licensing restrictions can still substantially affect
vital First Amendment interests relating to free speech, inquiry, association, and academic freedom.9 9
In addition to economic embargoes and licensing restrictions,
travel from (and to) the United States today is subject to new technologically enhanced controls. In particular, federal officials currently
utilize computerized terrorist "watchlists," including the so-called "No
Fly List,"1 00 to regulate air travel from and to the United States. Travelers have their names checked against a federal database and can be
denied egress or ingress if found to be on the watchlist.10 1 Civil libertarians have asserted that protesters and activists have been placed on
the list for purely ideological reasons, a claim that has been difficult to
assess owing to the lack of transparency concerning the list.102
In sum, the basic territorial framework relating to physical egress
remains in place. The territorial First Amendment recognizes that
domestic residents have an interest in cross-border travel and movement. The right resides formally in the Fifth Amendment, although it
has a First Amendment component. One cannot be denied the right
of egress on condition that she disassociate from a lawful group or
enterprise or, presumably, take an oath of loyalty to the United States.
It does not appear that the United States currently imposes any purely
ideological restrictions on exit from the country. Travel rights can,
however, be outweighed by countervailing governmental interests in
diplomacy and national security. Economic embargoes, licensure
requirements, and "no fly" restrictions continue to limit the cross-border exchange of persons, information, and ideas. Nevertheless, the
trend with regard to most of these measures has been to liberalize
restrictions on cross-border movement and exchange.

99 See, e.g., Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
545 F.3d 4, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that regulations restricting educational
programs offered in Cuba by U.S. academic institutions did not violate the First
Amendment); see also Roth, supra note 19, at 276 (criticizing narrowness of some
travel embargo exemptions).
100 SeeJeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271,
321-22 (2008) (describing the compilation and use of the No Fly List).
101 See 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 122.75a (2009).
102 Eric Lichtblau, Terror List Wrongly Includes 24,000, While Some Actual Suspects
Escaped It, N.Y. TIEs, May 7, 2009, at A22. Critics have also claimed that the terrorist
watchlist is plagued by serious problems of over- and under-inclusiveness. Id.
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Commerce: Import and Export Controls

The territorial First Amendment restricts cross-border contacts in
a variety of ways. As discussed above, travel restrictions can significantly affect in-person information exchange and association. Restrictions on cross-border commercial exchange can also have an effect on
First Amendment speech, press, and associational interests. This section discusses the principal import and export controls associated with
the territorial First Amendment.
The United States has a vast and complex regulatory system with
respect to the cross-border exchange of tangible and intangible products, data, and informational materials. Historically, federal laws and
regulations have restricted the cross-border exchange of a wide variety
of First Amendment materials, including books, magazines, various
artistic works, television broadcasts, and computer code. Since the
founding, Congress has authorized broad search and seizure authority
at U.S. territorial borders. 103 Congress has express constitutional
authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations.1 0 4 It also possesses the inherent sovereign power to protect the nation from harmful articles of commerce. In this context, as in others, the territorial
First Amendment is of a markedly different character than its intraterritorial counterpart. As the Supreme Court observed in a decision
upholding the seizure of allegedly obscene films by customs agents:
"Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the
national borders rest on different considerations and different rules
of constitutional law from domestic regulations."' 0 5
1. Trading with the Enemy
Much of the modern legal and regulatory architecture for the
regulation of information flow at the national borders was constructed
during and as a direct response to World War I. The Trading with the
Enemy Act 0 6 (TWEA), enacted in 1917, regulates commercial trade
with designated "enemy" nations.' 0 7 The restrictions imposed under
TWEA have varied in response to shifting foreign policies over the
years. Some of the travel and trade restrictions discussed in the preceding sections were authorized pursuant to TWEA.10o
103 See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (noting that federal
laws authorize "plenary customs power" at the border).
104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
105 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973).
106 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2006).
107 See id. § 2 (defining "enemy" within the statute).
108 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 728-29, 734-35.
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As noted, the central goal of these border controls and embargoes is to isolate certain disfavored or enemy regimes economically.
First Amendment interests can be significantly affected by TWEA's
enforcement. For example, TWEA's trade restrictions have been used
over the years to ban or restrict the cross-border exchange of a broad
array of informational materials, including books, films, periodicals,
and other expressive material. 109 At the height of the Vietnam War in
the 1960s, federal officials seized books and newspapers produced in
North Vietnam and China and refused to allow their entry into the
United States until the addressees obtained import licenses. 11 0
Addressees were required to identify themselves to government officials-and to persuade them that the country from which the information had been exported was not receiving any financial benefit
from the importation. 1 1 Border seizures and restrictions were common during the period of war and civil unrest that prevailed in the
1960s and 1970s. Aggressive enforcement continued into the 1980s,
when the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) seized a variety of
books and magazines imported from Cuba.11 2
In response to federal enforcement activities under TWEA, Congress enacted two laws that were generally intended to facilitate the
exchange of information with foreign nations (including those subject
to economic embargoes). The Berman Amendment,1 1 3 enacted in
1988, precludes the executive from interfering with the import or
export of lawful "informational materials" under TWEA and other
federal laws.11 4 The class of "informational materials" is broadly
defined in regulations to include, without regard to the format or
medium of expression, "[p]ublications, films, posters, phonograph
records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact discs,
CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds." 15
109 Id. at 728-33.
110 Id. at 730.
111 Id. But cf Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (invalidating a
statute directing the Post Office not to deliver foreign communist political propaganda unless the addressee specifically requested its delivery).
112 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 731.
113 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 2502,
102 Stat. 1107, 1371 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2006)).
114 See Laura A. Michalec, Note, Trade with Cuba Under the Trading with the Enemy
Act: A Free Flow of Ideas and Information?, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 808, 816-19
(1991-1992) (describing the history of the Berman Amendment).
115 31 C.F.R. § 500.332 (2009) (defining "informational materials"). But see id.
§ 500.332(b) (1) (stating that the exemption does not apply to certain controlled
commodities under the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420 (2006)).
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Contrary to the apparent intent of the Berman Amendment,
OFAC continued after its passage to interpret "informational materials" quite narrowly. For example, the agency claimed that the Berman
Amendment's prohibition was not applicable to original artwork." 6
That interpretation was rejected by a federal district court.' 1 7 It also
claimed that the broadcast of the 1991 Pan American Games from
Cuba was not within the regulatory exemption relating to "informational materials," an interpretation one court deemed to be reasonable.1 18 In the Free Trade in Ideas Act of 1994,119 Congress responded
to the agency's interpretations by essentially reiterating the broad regulatory exemption with respect to "informational materials." 2 0
As a result of these enactments and implementing regulations,
federal regulatory agencies are required to exempt an array of "informational materials" from all U.S. import and export controls. Thus,
the territorial First Amendment permits federal officials to monitor
and regulate trade with designated enemy nations. In recognition of
the substantial First Amendment interests at stake with regard to crossborder information exchange, however, Congress (and in some cases
the courts) have constrained agencies' power to prohibit import or
export of certain trade materials that are "informational" in nature.
The Berman Amendment, the Free Trade in Ideas Act, and implementing regulations effectively ended the practice of seizing foreign
novels, pamphlets, and magazines at the territorial border. As the discussion that follows demonstrates, however, some significant restrictions on the cross-border exchange of information remain in place.

See Cernuda v. Heavy, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1546, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
117 See id. at 1554 (rejecting an agency interpretation that artwork did not constitute informational material).
118 See Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007, 1014-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that an OFAC interpretation regarding broadcasts was reasonable).
119 Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 525, 108 Stat. 382, 474 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 95a (4) (2006), 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2006)).
120 12 U.S.C. § 95a(4). Notwithstanding this legislative history, OFAC continues to
limit some forms of collaboration with foreign publishers, including government officials from foreign nations. See Tracy J. Chin, Note, An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How
OFAC's Regulations Restrain FirstAmendment Rights, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1883, 1890 (2008)
(critiquing agency interpretations limiting collaboration with some foreign publishers); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.577(a) (stating that the general license for publishing
does not apply to publishing activities by the "Government of Cuba"); id. § 500.206(c)
(stating that the exemption does not apply to "substantive or artistic alteration" of
materials).
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The Tariff Act and "Immoral" Materials

Customs and immigration officials still possess broad authority
under the Tariff Act of 1930121 to conduct border searches and to
seize any unauthorized items of commerce. 122 The Tariff Act
expressly restricts the importation of certain "immoral" articles of
commerce.12 3 The law attempts to track First Amendment doctrines
by distinguishing between protected and unprotected materials.
Thus, among other things the Tariff Act bans the importation of
materials that incite insurrection, convey a true threat, constitute
obscenity, may be used to procure an unlawful abortion, or advertise a
lottery.124 Pursuant to the authority granted by the Tariff Act, customs agents have seized books, newspapers, and other materials from
1 25
journalists and authors that were deemed subversive or obscene.
As a manifestation of the fact that the First Amendment operates
differently at the border, certain provisions of the Tariff Act vest
broad discretion in the Secretary of the Treasury. For example,
despite the import ban applicable to "immoral" and illegal items, the
Act allows the Secretary to permit importation of "the so-called classics
or books of recognized and established literary or scientific merit."126
Regulations also purport to authorize the Secretary to release a book
initially seized as "obscene" to its original consignee-if the Secretary
is satisfied that the book is a "classic" or has "recognized and estab121
122
123
124

19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1681b (2006).
See id. § 1305.
Id. § 1305(a).
Id. The prohibition reads, in relevant part:
All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any
foreign country any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular,
print, picture, or drawing containing any matter advocating or urging treason or insurrection against the United States, or forcible resistance to any
law of the United States, or containing any threat to take the life of or inflict
bodily harm upon any person in the United States, or any obscene book,
pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing, or
other representation, figure, or image on or of paper or other material, or
any cast, instrument, or other article which is obscene or immoral, or any
drug or medicine or any article whatever for causing unlawful abortion, or
any lottery ticket, or any printed paper that may be used as a lottery ticket, or
any advertisement of any lottery.

Id.
125 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 733. In 1973, the Supreme Court held
that the Tariff Act was constitutional as applied to the importation of obscene materials for private use. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123,
139 (1973).
126 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a).
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lished literary or scientific merit."1 27 It is not clear whether, and if so,
how often, such discretionary authority has actually been exercised.
The "classics" provisions do not appear to have been challenged in
any court.
The territorial infrastructure relating to broad customs authority
to seize certain materials remains largely intact. As noted earlier, the
Tariff Act provides ample authority to restrict the importation of illegal items of commerce. Customs officials continue to search materials
and seize illegal items at the territorial borders. However, broad
exemptions for "informational materials" have substantially limited
the materials subject to seizure at the borders. Of course, today much
of this material travels across borders in digital form. This does not
mean that it is exempt from regulation or seizure; but it has become
far more difficult to regulate. I will consider digitization's effect on
the territorial First Amendment in Part 111.128
3.

Border Searches and New Technologies: A First Amendment
"Exception"?

The era of the personal computer has raised some new concerns
regarding the territorial First Amendment. In a globalized society,
international travelers routinely carry computing devices, which are
typically filled with expressive material, at the border. The question
has arisen whether the First Amendment requires an exception to the
broad search and seizure authority customs officials possess at the
nation's borders.
Ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements, such as probable
cause and the issuance of warrants, do not generally apply to routine
searches and seizures at the border. 129 As the Supreme Court has
said, "[i]t is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the
inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting,
its territorial integrity."13 0 At least since the framing of the Fourth
Amendment, Congress has delegated broad authority to customs officials to search persons and items at the border.13 1
127 19 C.F.R. § 12.40(g) (2009).
128 See infra Part III.A.2.
129 See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) ("The Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith
at the international border.").
130 Id. at 153.
131 The current version of the customs statute is expansive:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or
vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters . . . or
at any other authorized place ... and examine the manifest and other docu-
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Although most of the constitutional concerns regarding border
searches relate to the Fourth Amendment, serious First Amendment
issues can also arise. As we have seen, information and ideas flow
across the border in many different forms. Traditionally, this has
included written and recorded materials. In United States v. Ramsey,132
the Supreme Court held that the probable cause and warrant requirements did not apply to the opening of incoming international letterclass mail by customs officials.13 3 Such searches were deemed reasonable merely by virtue of their location. 1 34 The Ramsey Court summarily dismissed any First Amendment concerns, reasoning that the
detailed regulatory restrictions on opening letter mail negated any
concern regarding the chilling of expression.1 3 5 "Accordingly," the
Court said, "we find it unnecessary to consider the constitutional
reach of the First Amendment in this area in the absence of the
existing statutory and regulatory protection." 3 6
Ramsey thus declined an invitation to de-territorialize constitutional scrutiny of border searches involving expressive materials. The
invitation has recently been proffered anew-and again declined-in
cases involving more modern forms of communication. Laptops and
other computing devices now routinely carried by international travelers contain private and expressive material including diaries, medical information, personal correspondence, and financial records.
Travelers subjected to warrantless border searches have challenged
the searches on both Fourth Amendment and First Amendment
grounds.
So far, courts have refused to recognize any First Amendment
exception to the broad border search authority of customs and other
officials.13 7 In United States v. Ickes,13 8 Mr. Ickes attempted to enter the
United States from Canada.1 3 9 When U.S. Customs agents searched
ments and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and
every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board ....
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
132 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
133 See id. at 619.
134 See id. ("Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, have been considered to be 'reasonable' by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside.").
135 Id. at 623.
136 Id. at 624.
137 This would be in the nature of an exception to an exception, in that the First
Amendment would dictate that courts not follow the border search exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements.
138 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
139 Id. at 502.
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his van, they found several images of child pornography stored in
photo albums and on Ickes's computer. 1 4 0 The court upheld the warrantless search of Ickes's computer under the Fourth Amendment's
border search exception.14 1 It also rejected Ickes's argument that the
bare "reasonableness" standard was not appropriate as applied to
"expressive" material. 4 2 To hold otherwise, the court said, would
"create a sanctuary at the border for all expressive material-even for
terrorist plans."14 3 It would also, said the court, create "significant
headaches" for those required to determine the scope of the proposed exception.144 "These sorts of legal wrangles at the border," the
court said, "are exactly what the Supreme Court wished to avoid by
sanctioning expansive border searches."1 45
In United States v. Arnold,1 4 6 the Ninth Circuit reached the same
conclusion. Customs officers at Los Angeles International Airport
examined the contents of Arnold's laptop computer without reasonable suspicion.' 4 7 After requiring Arnold to boot up the computer,
agents clicked on two desktop folders labeled "Kodak Pictures" and
"Kodak Memories."1 48 Believing that these folders contained images
of child pornography, the agents referred Arnold to U.S. Department
of Homeland Security and immigration officials for interrogation.149
Arnold, who had traveled from the Philippines, was later charged with
knowingly transporting images of child pornography in foreign commerce. so The Ninth Circuit held that reasonable suspicion was not
required to conduct a search of Arnold's laptop at the "functional
equivalent" of the international border.1 5 1 The court held that the
search was not sufficiently intrusive of privacy concerns to require any
degree of suspicion.15 2 With regard to Arnold's argument that the
First Amendment required some level of suspicion prior to search, the
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 506.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
147 Id. at 1005.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See id. at 1006, 1008. The Supreme Court has stated that international airports
are the "functional equivalent" of the border. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
152 Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009.
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Ninth Circuit simply reiterated and adopted the reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit in Ickes.15 3
In this context, at least, it is apparent that globalization and digitization have not altered the territorial First Amendment. Expressive
interests are enforced differently, if at all, at the territorial borders.15 4
Like other border searches, warrantless and suspicionless searches of
computing devices have been deemed valid merely by virtue of their
location. This is so despite the fact that the search of computing
devices is in some cases a more substantial invasion than, say, a search
of papers or international mail.
4.

Export Administration

A variety of technical regulations restrict the cross-border
exchange of certain types of otherwise lawful speech and information.
The Export Administration Act of 1979155 (EAA), a successor to earlier and much more stringent Cold War export control laws, provides
the current statutory authority for export controls on sensitive materials and technologies, some of which have both civilian and military
applications.15 6 Other federal laws and regulations restrict or prohibit
the cross-border exchange of military materials.157 The common purpose of these laws is to regulate, generally through a system of licensure, any exchanges of information that could be detrimental to the
security of the United States.' 5 8
153 See id. at 1010; see also United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1011-12 (9th Cir.
2008) (Callahan, J., concurring) (affirming that there is no First Amendment exception to border search authority).
154 But see Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 101-02 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying
ordinary First Amendment standards to a claim that border detention violated
associative rights, but noting that less rigorous scrutiny may be appropriate in the
border context).
155 Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420 (2006)).
156 The EAA, which originally expired in 1989, has been periodically reauthorized
for short periods of time. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION AcT 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL31
832.pdf. At other times, including currently, the export licensing system created
under the authority of the EAA has been continued by the invocation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006).
FERGUSSON, Supra, at 1.
157 The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22
U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2 (2006), which is administered by the Departments of State
and Defense, regulates this material.
158 Cf Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915, 916-918 (7th Cir. 1984)
(upholding, under commercial speech standard, the application of EAA and imple-
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The EAA prohibits the sharing, without a license, of "information
and know-how (whether in tangible form .

.

. or in intangible form

) that can be used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or
reconstruct goods, including computer software and technical
data." 5 9 According to the most recent figures, there are approximately 2400 dual-use items on what is known as the "Commerce Control List," which is compiled pursuant to export control regulations.1 6 0
Owing to their dual-use capabilities, computers, computer technology,
and technological data are of particular concern under the EAA and
its implementing regulations.16 '
Under the current Export Administration Regulations (EAR),
promulgated pursuant to the EAA, computer software, equipment,
and technical data that have both civilian and military applications
cannot be exported to certain countries without an export license.16 2
A similar license, known as a "deemed export" license, is required
whenever sensitive technology is shared with foreign nationals working in U.S. schools or laboratories-apparently on the ground that
the foreign national may return home and reproduce the technology
there.16 3 In effect, the "deemed export" rule moves the territorial
border inward and treats exchanges inside the United States as
"exports" of restricted technology.
The effect these licensing provisions have on cross-border information exchange and First Amendment liberties may be relatively
minor. Most EAR license applications are ultimately approved, and
relatively few appear to involve the delicate First Amendment issues
raised by the "deemed export" rules (discussed below). 164 Some specific licensing provisions have raised First Amendment issues, howmenting regulations to a domestic corporation's provision of business data to a foreign organization).
159 50 U.S.C. app. § 2415.
160 LAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION Acr 8
(2008), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/1671.
pdf.
161 See FERGUSSON, supra note 156, at 14-19.
162 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.1-774.1 (2009). A separate set of regulations, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, governs military technology and equipment. See
22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-130.17 (2009).
163

See 15 C.F.R.

§

734.2 (stating that the release of technology or software to a

foreign national in the United States can constitute a "deemed" export to the person's home country).
164 See FERGUSSON, supra note 156, at 10, 18 (noting that in 2008, officials
approved 84% of all license applications and that in 2007, officials reviewed 1056
"deemed export licenses," which constituted 5.4% of all submitted license
applications).
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ever. For example, export controls relating to technical data have
raised concerns regarding licensure of computer code and other
expressive technologies.1 6 5 Some of these constitutional concerns
have been resolved or substantially ameliorated through amendment
of the EAR. For example, earlier versions of the EAR applicable to
source and encryption computer code were successfully challenged as
unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.1 66 In response both to
these legal challenges and international market conditions in which
computer source code has become a significant export commodity,
the EAR now generally permit the cross-border publication and sharing of computer source code. 167
Licensing of encryption technology has also been decontrolled
under the EAR; today, retail encryption products and technology can
be exported to Western countries and nongovernmental end-users
pursuant to a general license exemption.1 68 The current version of
the EAR also contains broad exemptions for "[plublicly available"
technology; software and other material that "arise [s] during, or
result[s] from, fundamental research;" and for educational information. 169 Finally, consistent with the approach taken under other trade
laws, the EAR generally exempt from licensure a host of "informational materials" which do not implicate national security and defense
concerns.170
165 See Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889,
905-12 (1986) (discussing First Amendment concerns with regard to federal laws regulating the export of technical data). See generally E. John Park, Protecting the Core
Values of the First Amendment in an Age of New Technologies: Scientific Expression vs.
NationalSecurity, 2 VA.J.L. & TECH. 3 (1997) (discussing the First Amendment implications of federal export controls regarding encryption technology and other scientific
expression).
166 SeeJunger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that source
code is expressive and remanding for consideration in light of EAR source code
amendments); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that source code is expressive and that the EAR constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint), reh'g granted, opinion withdrawn by 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir.
1999).
167 See 15 C.F.R. § 740.17 (authorizing the export of source code to private endusers under license exception, but only after technical review).
168 Id.
169 See id. § 734.3(b) (3) (exempting "[p]ublicly available" technology and software
that arises during or results from "fundamental research"); id. § 734.8 (defining
"[flundamental research"); id. § 734.9 (defining exempt "[e]ducational
information").
170 Specifically, the EAR exempt the following materials:
Prerecorded phonograph records reproducing in whole or in part, the content of printed books, pamphlets, and miscellaneous publications, including
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Although they have liberalized and decontrolled certain aspects
of cross-border information exchange, these EAR amendments and
exemptions have not resolved all First Amendment issues relating to
current export controls. 17 1 In particular, the First Amendment implications of the "deemed export" regulations have not been tested in
court.
The EAR prohibit private parties like universities and research
laboratories from sharing information with foreign students without
first obtaining a license from regulators.17 2 To treat the sharing of
information with resident aliens within American research and academic institutions as a restricted "export" may trench upon academic
freedom and other fundamental First Amendment interests. The Reagan administration invoked the EAR against scientists and academics
who merely delivered academic papers to foreign audiences without
first obtaining an export license.1 73 Note that the information in
question is neither classified nor owned by the government (although
some of it has been produced using federal funds) .174 In other contexts, the First Amendment would likely protect one private party
from sharing information with another private party-even if there
was some possibility that the information might be used for evil or
illegal purposes.1 7 5 At the border and its "deemed" equivalent, however, First Amendment considerations may be quite different.17 6 The
newspapers and periodicals; printed books, pamphlets, and miscellaneous
publications including bound newspapers and periodicals; children's picture
and painting books; newspaper and periodicals, unbound, excluding waste;
music books; sheet music; calendars and calendar blocks, paper; maps,
hydrographical charts, atlases, gazetteers, globe covers, and globes (terrestrial and celestial); exposed and developed microfilm reproducing, in whole
or in part, the content of any of the above; exposed and developed motion
picture film and soundtrack; and advertising printed matter exclusively
related thereto.
Id. § 734.3(b) (2).
171 For a general discussion of the First Amendment concerns relating to export
controls on the exchange of scientific and technical information, see Kamenshine,
supra note 1.
172 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b).
173 Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 741.
174 See Kamenshine, supra note 1, at 886-90 (discussing regulation of the speech
of private grantees under conditional grants).
175 See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)
(invalidating municipal ban on posting of "for sale" or "sold" signs on homeowners'
properties, put in place to prevent so-called "white flight").
176 See Kamenshine, supra note 1, at 876 (arguing that regulation of the import
and export of scientific and technological information should generally be subject to
rational basis review).
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territorial First Amendment may permit regulators to control certain
information exchanges that implicate national security at the fictional
"border" within research institutions.17 7

As in other cross-border contexts, a territorial framework continues to govern export of a variety of materials that may implicate
national security. Export controls have been liberalized to some
extent to allow for the sharing of nonmilitary informational materials,
including some computer code. But export licensure provisions still
restrict the exchange of critical digital-era information, including
"know-how" and technical data that constitute otherwise lawful expression. Moreover, the "deemed export" rule demonstrates how the territorial border can be redefined or manipulated to restrict otherwise
lawful intraterritorialinformation exchange.
5.

Cross-Border Artistic and Educational Exchanges: The Beirut
Agreement

As noted, the territorial First Amendment sometimes implicates
cross-border educational and artistic exchanges. The sharing of films,
music, books, and other works has sometimes been restricted under
U.S. trade laws. In 1949, the United States signed the Beirut Agreement,178 a multilateral treaty intended to facilitate international dissemination of films and other audiovisual materials of an educational,
scientific, and cultural character.1 7 9 Under the agreement and implementing regulations, qualifying materials were exempt from customs
duties, import licenses, special rates, quantitative restrictions, and
other costs.18 0 For many domestic film distributors, these costs can
substantially restrict the ability to place materials in foreign
commerce.
In order to receive the benefits provided under the treaty, distributors had to obtain a certificate from the appropriate governmental
agency in the country of the material's origin attesting to the item's
educational, scientific, or cultural character.18 1 Until 1999, when its
177 See Sunstein, supra note 165, at 905-12 (discussing the balance of First Amendment interests and national security concerns under export controls relating to informational exchange).
178 Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory
Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, openedfor signatureJuly
15, 1949, 17 U.S.T. 1578, 197 U.N.T.S. 3.
179 See id. Congress passed an implementing statute in 1966, and formal operations under the agreement began in 1967. SeeJoint Resolution of Oct. 8, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-634, 80 Stat. 879 (formal ratification).
180 See Beirut Agreement, supra note 178, 17 U.S.T. at 1581-82, 197 U.N.T.S. at 6.
181 See 22 C.F.R. § 61 (2009).
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functions were transferred to the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (BECA), the Beirut Agreement was
enforced by the United States Information Agency (USIA). 182 The
USIA's implementing regulations required that the agency apply a
variety of "substantive criteria" for determining eligibility.1 8 3 One regulation provided that the agency would not certify material that
attempted to "influence opinion, conviction or policy;" "espouse a
cause;" or "attack a particular persuasion."18 4 Another provision
denied certification to material "which may lend itself to misinterpretation, or misrepresentation of the United States or other
countries."18 5
In 1988, a federal appeals court invalidated these regulations on
the ground that they were content-based restrictions on speech that
did not serve any compelling government interest.18 6 The USIA then
promulgated new regulations.1 8 7 After these too were challenged as
violating the First Amendment, the President signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. 18 8 The Act provides that the agency
may not deny a customs exemption to materials because they advocate
a particular position or viewpoint, might lend themselves to misinterpretation or to misrepresentation of the United States, are not representative, authentic, or accurate, do not augment international
understanding or goodwill, or are in the opinion of the agency "propaganda."18 9 The House Report accompanying the bill explains that
the legislation is intended to ensure that U.S. obligations under the
Beirut Agreement "are carried out in a manner that is consistent with
the spirit of the Agreement and with the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."o9 0 Current regulations still allow for
some minimal content review of materials. For example, officials may
deny an exemption for materials that fail to "maintain, increase or
182 Compare 22 C.F.R. § 502.1 (1999) ("The [USIA] administers the 'Beirut Agreement of 1948' ... ."), with 22 C.F.R. § 61.1 (2000) ("The Department of State administers the 'Beirut Agreement of 1948' .....
183 22 C.F.R. § 502.6 (1988).

184

22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b) (3) (1987) (repealed).

185 Id. § 502.6(b) (5) (repealed).
186 See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988).
187 See Propaganda as Educational and Cultural Material; World-Wide Free Flow
(Export-Import) of Audio-Visual Materials, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,753, 43,757 (Nov. 16,
1987).
188 Pub. L. No. 102-138, 105 Stat. 647 (1991) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2051
(2006)).
189 19 U.S.C. §§ 2051(1)-(5).
190 H.R. Rep. No. 102-53, at 65-66 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 384,
419-20.
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diffuse knowledge" 9 1 or "[have] as [their] primary purpose or effect
to amuse or entertain." 192
By signing the Beirut Agreement, the United States committed to
facilitate cross-border exchange of artistic and educational materials.
Although some content review is still authorized under agency regulations, courts have reviewed agency viewpoint discrimination with great
skepticism. With judicial encouragement, the political branches have
sought to bring enforcement of the Beirut Agreement into compliance with First Amendment standards.
6.

Dissemination of Foreign "Propaganda"

As noted, during certain historical periods the United States has
sought to erect territorial barriers to the dissemination of foreign
ideas. This wariness with regard to foreign ideas and influences continues to be manifested in restrictions on the dissemination of certain
foreign content inside the United States.
For example, the Foreign Agents Registration Acts9 3 (FARA) regulates the importation and dissemination of certain foreign books,
films, and periodicals, including some materials not covered by
TWEA. FARA was initially intended to restrict the importation of foreign political propaganda, in particular Nazi-sponsored materials.194
FARA does not bar dissemination of foreign material. Rather, it
requires that foreign "agents" register with the United States Attorney
General and file with that office any "informational materials" that are
to be distributed for or in the interest of foreign principals.19 5
At various historical junctures, FARA, like TWEA, was applied
broadly to restrict the cross-border flow of informational materials. In
the early 1980s, for example, FARA was enforced against the importers of three Canadian films that concerned acid rain and the threat of
nuclear war. 196 In an enforcement challenge brought by the films'
distributors, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to FARA's requirement that "foreign political propaganda" be
labeled as such prior to distribution in the United States.19 7 The
Court concluded that Congress had not thereby burdened or substantially chilled the domestic dissemination of foreign speech; rather, it
191 22 C.F.R. § 61.3(b) (1) (2009).
192 Id. § 61.3(b) (4); see also id. § 61.3 (setting forth certification standards).
193 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (2006).
194 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 735.
195 22 U.S.C. §§ 612, 614; see Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 736 (describing enforcement under the Act).
196 See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987).
197 Id. at 480-81.
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had "simply required the disseminators of such material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the
import of the propaganda." 1 9 8
Rodney Smolla, among others, has strongly assailed the Court's
reasoning.' 9 9 He traces the "foreign political propaganda" restrictions to the "ugly history" of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, and
more generally to a history of xenophobia and fear of foreign ideas. 2 00
But according to the Court the territorial First Amendment does not
preclude the government from regulating, and perhaps implicitly
commenting upon the value of, foreign speech that crosses the border. Commentators have noted, however, that FARA has been
plagued by a variety of enforcement problems.2 0 ' Thus, it does not
appear that FARA substantially affects distribution of foreign propaganda materials in the United States.
7.

Cross-Border Contacts and Associations

Finally, the territorial First Amendment limits the extent to which
domestic persons may associate with foreign persons, entities, and
organizations. In general, U.S. citizens and resident aliens have the
right to speak to and associate with resident aliens and foreign entities
located within U.S. territorial borders, assuming of course that such
persons and entities are lawfully present and are not engaged in illegal activity. With regard to cross-border contacts, criminal laws proscribe a variety of illegal associations. As noted earlier, citizens and
resident aliens have no First Amendment right to hear or associate in
person with a foreign speaker who has been denied entry to the
United States (although they have the right to receive information
from foreign persons and organizations through other means).202
National surveillance programs have apparently ensnared telephone
and other communications between domestic speakers and foreign
contacts; however, First Amendment challenges to such surveillance
activities have generally failed for lack of standing. 203
198 Id. at 480.
199 See RODNEY A. SMoLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 361-67 (1992).
200 Id. at 363-64.
201 See Charles Lawson, Note, Shining the 'Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity' on ForeignLobbyists? Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying DisclosureAct of 1995 on the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1151, 1164-67 (1996) (discussing FARA
enforcement problems).
202 See supra notes 23, 38-42 and accompanying text.
203 See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 667-73 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the surveillance program on First
Amendment grounds).
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U.S. laws restrict the right to associate with foreign persons and
entities in certain designated contexts. For example, spending conditions placed on foreign aid may affect the ability of domestic persons
and organizations to associate with foreign activists and collaborators. 2 0 4 U.S. law also restricts the extent to which domestic citizens
and resident aliens may represent foreign entities and interests inside
the United States. For example, the Foreign Missions Act 2 0 5 authorizes the State Department to regulate foreign missions in the United
States and to close them if "necessary to protect the interests of the
United States." 206 The D.C. Circuit has held that U.S. citizens and
resident aliens do not have a First Amendment speech or association
right to represent a foreign entity on U.S. soil.207 The court cited
national security and foreign policy considerations as grounds for
granting broad deference to agency decisions regarding such foreign
contacts.2 08
The closure of a foreign mission does not restrict the ability to
otherwise associate with foreign entities or to advocate their causes.
However, terrorism-related laws impose substantial restrictions on
contacts, collaboration, and cross-border advocacy. Specifically, federal laws and regulations restrict the financial and other support
domestic persons and organizations may provide to foreign entities
that have been designated "foreign terrorist organizations." 209
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,210 as
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, prohibits the provision of "training," "expert advice and assistance," "financial services," "personnel,"
and other forms of assistance to designated terrorist organizations. 2 1 1
Several courts have rejected First Amendment, vagueness, and overbreadth challenges to the State Department's "foreign terrorist organ204 See DKT Mem'I Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 277, 282, 299
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding family planning aid restrictions that allegedly interfered
with the right of domestic organizations to associate with foreign organizations).
205 22 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4316 (2006).
206 Id. § 4305(b) (3).
207 See Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding a State Department order closing a Palestinian mission).
208 See id. at 942 ("[Olur deference to the State Department on questions of foreign policy is great.").
209 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2006).
210 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 42, and 50 U.S.C.).
211 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1) (2006) (defining "material support or resources");
id. §§ 2339B(a) (1), (g) (4) (prohibiting the provision of various forms of "material
support or resources" to foreign terrorist organizations).
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ization" designations.2 12 Some courts have held, however, that certain
statutory definitions of prohibited "material support" to such organizations are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 2 13
The government undoubtedly has the power to apply the material support prohibitions to conduct that facilitates terrorist activity.
But the law as written appears to go much further. Indeed, as interpreted by the government, the restrictions would appear to prohibit
U.S. residents from engaging in even pure political speech-i.e.,
assisting with the filing of United Nations claims and providing training in the use of international and humanitarian law-that promotes
lawful and nonviolent activity. 2 14
The obvious goal of the material support prohibition is to prevent contacts with and assistance to foreign organizations that are a
threat to national security. The territorial First Amendment permits
the government to regulate foreign contacts that are intended to facilitate terrorist activity or pose other national security threats. Whether,
or to what extent, it may do so by targeting the communications or
associations themselves is an issue the Supreme Court will likely soon
decide.2 1 5
II.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL FIRST AMENDMENT

The relationship between territory and the First Amendment
extends beyond, and indeed is far more complex than, the regulatory
concerns represented by the territorial First Amendment. Globalization, digitization, and other social and political forces have called into
question some longstanding suppositions about the First Amendment's territorial scope or domain. As territorial borders have
become softer in a regulatory sense, they have also begun to fade
somewhat as markers of the First Amendment's spheres of application
and influence. The issues addressed in this Part relate primarily to
212 See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 736-37 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (upholding OFAC designation of a group as a branch of a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist"); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 357 (4th Cir.
2004) (upholding a conviction for materially supporting a designated foreign terrorist organization); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57,
85 (D.D.C. 2002) (upholding the designation of a Muslim group as a foreign terrorist
organization).
213 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 928-31 (9th Cir.
2009) (upholding in part and invalidating in part definitions of various forms of assistance rendered to foreign terrorist organization), cert. granted sub nom., Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
214 Id.
215 See id.
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the relationship between the First Amendment and persons or activities beyond U.S. territorial borders. This is the First Amendment's
extraternitoialdimension.
First Amendment norms and standards can cross borders in a
variety of ways. For example, courts and lawmakers in countries
outside the United States may be persuaded by and therefore adopt
American speech principles and doctrines.2 1 6 The process of norm
transmission is an important aspect of the First Amendment's territorial dimension, one to which I will return in Part III. This Part examines four specific ways in which U.S. officials might expand the
influence and scope of the First Amendment. It considers efforts or
proposals to (1) extend U.S. laws, including the statutory framework
for protection of intellectual property, beyond U.S. borders; (2)
shield speakers and publishers in the United States from foreign libel
judgments obtained abroad, hence exporting First Amendment libel
standards; (3) export First Amendment norms through regulations of
U.S. technology companies, diplomacy, export controls, and funding;
and (4) export the First Amendment's substantive protections to
restrictions on speech, press, and associational activities abroad, for
the benefit of U.S. citizens, aliens, or both.
A.

Regulating Foreign Speech

The global scale of communications and the globalization of
commerce have given rise to concerns regarding the extraterritorial
reach of domestic speech laws. The once-clear line between domestic
and foreign speech has begun to blur. Speech that is created in, and
disseminated from, one corner of the world now routinely and effortlessly crosses international borders. Moreover, speech that originates
and is disseminated in one nation can have substantial negative effects
on persons, businesses, and organizations located across the globe.2 1 7
To what extent can U.S. laws be applied to foreign expression?
The digitization of expression has produced two basic schools of
thought regarding the traditional regime of territorial governance.2 18
As David Post has observed, "unexceptionalists," as the label implies,
216 For a general consideration of the merits of First Amendment importation, see
(Ian Loveland ed., 1998) (examining freedom of
speech in Britain, Europe, and the United States).
217 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law
from the Nation-State, 41 Hous. L. REv. 885, 952-53 (2004) (noting that some courts
have been willing to "treat [trademark] doctrine more flexibly in order to accommodate the demands of global commerce").
218 The dilemma obviously extends beyond expressive concerns. Purely commercial activity, for example, may similarly be affected, chilled, or deterred.
IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
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do not consider it at all unusual that a nation would apply its speech
laws to content that crosses its borders-even though it crosses many
national borders at once. 2 19 Even in the digital era, unexceptionalists
reason, national sovereignty encompasses the power to regulate and
prohibit expression that crosses sovereign borders. This authority
exists whether the expression happens to traverse borders digitally or
by more traditional means, such as by mail.
"Exceptionalists," by contrast, claim that the Internet has fundamentally altered traditional conceptions of territorial governance. 220
Given that the Internet has essentially erased territorial borders,
exceptionalists argue, the territorial model is no longer viable. 221
They insist that a speaker who uses the Internet ought not to be
forced to comply with the obscenity, libel, hate speech, and other
speech laws in force across the globe.2 2 2 According to exceptionalists,
a healthy, robust, global marketplace of ideas requires that we rethink
and indeed replace traditional territorial governance models. What is
needed, according to some exceptionalists, is a uniform global expressive standard. 223 As Post says: "Global law for a global Internet."224
This debate is hardly theoretical. For example, a French court
ordered Yahoo! Inc. to remove Nazi paraphernalia from its U.S. servers so that French consumers would not be able to purchase them.2 2 5
Although the material in question was protected by the First Amendment inside U.S. territory, the company was ordered to comply with
French speech laws by making it unavailable inside France's borders.2 26
The Yahoo! case highlights the burdens that may be placed on a
speaker in the global marketplace. Without uniform laws on subjects
such as hate speech, the speaker may be subject to liability in multiple
jurisdictions. As exceptionalists claim, the problem is that each country may impose extraterritorial duties on speakers. As Post argues:
"Unexceptionalist logic leads inexorably to the conclusion that (just
about) everything you do on the Web may be subject to (just about)
everybody's law."22 7
219 DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE 166-67 (2009).
220 Id. at 167-69.
221 Id. at 167-68.
222 Id.
223 See id. at 170.
224 Id.
225 See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1201-04, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (dismissing a
declaratory judgment action filed by Yahoo! on ripeness and jurisdictional grounds).
226 See id. at 1201-04.
227

PosT, supra note 219, at 167.
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The Yahoo! case demonstrates one way in which foreign laws
might be imported to U.S. territories. The flip side of this scenario
involves a situation in which speakers located outside U.S. borders are
subjected to First Amendment laws and standards. Suppose a website
operator in Thailand produces and distributes, via the Internet, a film
depicting animal cruelty-an activity that is perfectly legal in the jurisdiction of origin but may violate U.S. law. 2 2 8 A U.S. law that criminalizes distribution of such depictions can presumably be applied to a
foreign website operator, assuming she is present in the United States.
The Thai speaker forced to comply with speech laws across the globe,
including those in the United States, occupies essentially the same
position as Yahoo! in its contest with French authorities. Assuming
she cannot geographically target her content (as Yahoo! claimed it
could not in the litigation), the speaker may be chilled from communicating the information at all or may feel compelled to alter the
expression to meet U.S. speech standards. In this situation, the First
Amendment has some extraterritorial impact. 229
In the above example, one might argue that there is no exportation of First Amendment standards. After all, the speech has entered
U.S. borders and is subject to U.S. laws on that basis. Exportation is
perhaps clearer when U.S. laws are applied beyond the territory of the
United States based either upon a clear congressional intent to legislate extraterritorially or based upon the intraterritorial effects produced by foreign expression. 2 3 0 Although there is a longstanding
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, several
228 The facts are similar to those in a case now pending before the Supreme
Court. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220-21, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (invalidating a federal law barring depictions of animal cruelty, even when the
depictions were legal in the place or territory of origin), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1984
(2009); see also Adam Liptak, First Amendment Claim in Cockfight Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 2007, at A13 (describing a lawsuit filed by a company that broadcasts cockfights
that challenges the constitutionality of the federal law that makes it a crime to sell
depictions of animal cruelty).
229 Of course, the discussion assumes that the speaker will either be present within
the United States or will have sufficient contacts with the country to make enforcement of any judgment against it possible. That may not be true in many cases, particularly those involving individual speakers rather than multinational corporations.
Moreover, U.S. speech laws are quite liberal relative to those of other countries. It
may be a relatively rare case in which expression that is legal in its country of origin
nevertheless violates U.S. laws. But on such occasions, like the one hypothesized,
where U.S. law may chill or prohibit speech that is legal elsewhere, the question of the
First Amendment's territorial domain is squarely presented.
230 See KAL RAusTIALA, DoES THE CONSTITUTION FoLLOW THE FLAG? 111-15 (2009)
(discussing the rise of extraterritorial application of U.S. laws).
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federal laws, including provisions relating to employment, securities,
and antitrust, have been given extraterritorial effect.2 3 1
Intellectual property laws regulate and in some cases restrict the
sharing of ideas and information. Patent, copyright, and trademark
laws are important components of the system of free expression in the
United States. Although they are sometimes in sharp tension with
First Amendment principles, 2 32 these laws seek to balance rights in
intellectual property with the free flow of information. 23 3 Intellectual
property is produced and regulated in an increasingly complex international system. The sole question here is: to what extent is the
domestic balance manifested in U.S. intellectual property laws applicable beyond U.S. borders?
For the most part, U.S. intellectual property laws remain territorially bounded. Copyright and patent laws generally have no direct
extraterritorial effect; courts have held that these laws may reach foreign conduct only when that conduct actively induces or contributes
to infringements occurring within U.S. territory.2 3 4 In other words,
there must be an act of infringement within the United States for patent or copyright laws to apply. Although some commentators have
argued that globalization and digitization require a more liberal
approach to territoriality, thus far a strict territorial approach has
largely been retained in the copyright and patent areas. 2 35 In contrast
to other areas in which laws have been given express extraterritorial
reach, the United States has sought protection for domestic copyright
231 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 258 (1991) (reaffirming
the territorial presumption); Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual Property Rights in
an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 511-13 (1997) (discussing the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws).
232 For an analysis of the tension between intellectual property rights and the First
Amendment, see DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009).
233 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) ("Indeed, copyright's purpose
is to promote the creation and publication of free expression.").
234 See Bradley, supra note 231, at 523, 526. Patent law was given some limited
extraterritorial application in 1984. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (f) (2006) (providing that
exportation of unassembled components of patented invention is an infringement if
the exporter actively induces assembly of the device outside the United States). But
see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 457-59 (2007) (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality despite the enactment of § 271(f)).
235 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 477-89 (2000) (considering the effect of
the Internet on copyright and territoriality); Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritorialityin
U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2119, 2128 (2008) (arguing that absent any
conflict with foreign law, U.S. courts should generally be willing to enforce patents
extraterritorially).
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and patent interests primarily in the international arena, through the
negotiation of treaties and agreements. 2 3 6
Trademark laws have been treated differently, however. In Steele
v. Bulova Watch Co., 2 37 the Supreme Court held that the Lanham
Act 2 3 8 applied to the conduct of a U.S. citizen who had allegedly
affixed a trademark to watches sold in Mexico.2 3 9 Some lower courts
have not interpreted the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act
quite so expansively. These courts apply a balancing test that considers the domestic effects of the defendant's conduct, the defendant's
citizenship, and the likelihood of a conflict between U.S. and foreign
intellectual property law. 240 As Curtis Bradley notes, the effect of this
ad hoc balancing is that "the extraterritorial scope of the Lanham Act
varies to some extent from circuit to circuit." 2 41 Bradley argues that
the extraterritorial application of trademark law is inconsistent with
the presumption against extraterritoriality, public international law,
and separation of powers principles. 24 2 Under the balancing test
mentioned above, courts have tended to limit the extraterritorial
reach of the Lanham Act, particularly where the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that the foreign activity had "substantial effects" within
the United States. 243
In both indirect and direct ways, the First Amendment can have
some limited extraterritorial impact on foreign expression. Foreign
speakers, particularly those that broadcast messages on the Web, must
at least be cognizant of U.S. and other national laws and may be subject to them. U.S. intellectual property laws have some limited extraterritorial reach as well. The critical question with regard to
extraterritorial application in these contexts is whether the foreign
conduct produces some intraterritorial effects or consequences that
the United States is entitled to prevent or punish. This "effects test,"
which permits a sovereign to regulate the conduct of persons not
within its allegiance when such conduct has disfavored domestic
236 RAUSTIALA, supra note 230, at 121.
237 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
238 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2006).
239 Steele, 344 U.S. at 284-86. The defendant had purchased component parts in
the United States and some of the watches had turned up in the United States. Id. at
285.
240 Bradley, supra note 231, at 528-29.
241 Id. at 529.
242 Id. at 531, 546-50, 562-65.
243 See, e.g., Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274,
1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply the Lanham Act to foreign conduct
where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate substantial effects within United States, aside
from the earning of royalties and commissions).

20101

TERRITORIALITY

AND

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1585

effects, has long been used by U.S. officials and courts to reach foreign conduct. 2 4 4 It has become increasingly salient in the globalization era. As speech continues to become digitized, we might expect to
see increased reliance upon the effects rationale in order to reach
foreign speech, expressive commerce, and information sharing.
B.

Libel Tourism: ExtraterritorialApplication of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

As noted, in the digital era, expression is often transmitted across
the globe in a matter of seconds. A newspaper report on a U.S. website may be distributed to a global readership. A book published in
the United States may be sold over the Internet in countries across the
world. Some of these publications may contain allegedly defamatory
statements or materials. Without a uniform or global libel law, a
speaker faces potential liability pursuant to the libel laws of every
nation in which publication occurs.
With increasing frequency, plaintiffs have sought and obtained
judgments against U.S. authors under foreign libel laws that are less
speech protective than U.S. laws. With regard to public officials and
public figures, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan245 requires that a plaintiff
prove that the defendant uttered false statements with "actual malice,"
which is defined as knowledge of or reckless disregard as to falsity. 246
Owing to the United Kingdom's plaintiff-friendly libel laws, which
place the burden on the defendant to prove truthfulness, Britain has
been the most common forum chosen for pursuing libel suits against
American speakers. 24 7 Critics have labeled the practice of obtaining
(and seeking to enforce) foreign libel judgments "libel tourism." 2 4 8
U.S. authors may have substantial grounds for concern and complaint. U.K courts have entered libel judgments against foreign
authors even when neither the authors nor the plaintiffs had particularly strong contacts with the jurisdiction. In one notorious case, a
British court entered a libel judgment against a U.S. author whose
book was sold over the Internet in very small quantities in the United
Kingdom. 249 This phenomenon has prompted concerns in the
244 See RAUSTLALA, supra note 230, at 102-04 (discussing the origins of the effects
test).
245 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
246 Id. at 279-80.
247 See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (Sup. Ct.
1992) (describing English libel law).
248 See Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
249 See id. at 103-05 (affirming dismissal on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the foreign judgment plaintiff).
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United States regarding the possible chilling effects libel tourism
might have on U.S. authors, scholars, and journalists, particularly
those who research and write about matters of global concern.
The issue here is similar to that raised in the Yahoo! case discussed earlier: in a globalized and digitized world, does or should the
First Amendment shield domestic speakers from less protective
speech laws abroad? Courts in the United States have generally
refused to enforce foreign libel judgments on the ground that they
contravene the First Amendment and are thus contrary to public policy. 250 Although courts generally appear to assume that judicial
enforcement of foreign libel judgments would constitute state action
that violates the First Amendment, this premise may well be false. 25 1
In any event, courts have generally refused to permit the importation
and enforcement of foreign libel judgments.
U.S. authors and publishers, still concerned that the foreign judgments remain enforceable in the issuing country and eager in any
event to clear their names, have obtained additional protection from
state and federal legislatures. New York enacted the Libel Terrorism
Protection Act,25 2 which provides that courts in New York need not
recognize foreign libel judgments entered without the full protections
granted under the First Amendment. 2 53 Illinois has enacted a similar
250 See Sari Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 478-80 (2d Cir.
2007); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 4-6 (D.D.C. 1995); Telnikoff v.
Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 240-51 (Md. 1997); Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 663-65
(denying the enforcement of a British libel judgment under New York law because
the judgment was not issued with the protections for free speech required by the U.S.
and New York Constitutions); cf Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189-90 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding unenforceable a French judgment requiring a service provider to remove Nazi-related
items from its website), rev'd on othergrounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
251 Scholars have disagreed as to whether the enforcement of foreign libel judgments obtained in jurisdictions that do not have First Amendment-like protections
for speakers would constitute "state action," thus arguably rendering enforcement
unconstitutional. Compare Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J.
171, 186 (2004) (arguing that enforcement would not constitute state action), with
Montr6 D. Carodine, PoliticalJudging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 1159, 1245 (2007) (arguing that the state action doctrine precludes
enforcement of some foreign libel judgments). See also Molly S. Van Houweling,
Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, the FirstAmendment, and Internet Speech: Notes for the Next
Yahoo! v. LICRA, 24 MicH. J. INT'L L. 697, 703 (2003) (suggesting that enforcement
of foreign judgments might be likened to other generally applicable laws that do not
trigger meaningful First Amendment scrutiny).
252 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(d), 5304(b) (8) (Consol. 2010).
253 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b) (8).
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law. 2 5 4 Congressional proposals would provide similar, and in some
cases additional, protections for U.S. speakers subject to foreign libel
judgments. A bill in the U.S. House of Representatives provides that
"a domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment
concerning defamation unless the domestic court determines that the
foreign judgment is consistent with the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States."25 5 Other pending House and Senate bills
would authorize federal court jurisdiction and create a cause of action
for a declaratory judgment and substantial money damages on behalf
of "[a] ny United States person" sued for defamation in a foreign
country if such speech or writing by that person "has been published,
uttered, or otherwise disseminated in the United States." 256
Insofar as treatment of foreign judgments is concerned, the judicial and legislative responses to foreign libel judgments are exceptional. Foreign judgments are routinely enforced in the United
States, even where the original claim could not have been maintained,
as a matter of law or public policy, inside U.S. territory. 2 57 Moreover,
under traditional conflicts principles, courts generally at least consider the forum's nexus to the dispute. 258 Yet the sweeping American
approaches to foreign libel judgments would forbid enforcement even
when the United States has a minimal territorial or other nexus to the
dispute and the forum nation has a substantial nexus or interest.
For example, in one case a libel judgment was obtained by an
English citizen against a journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 259 The comments at issue were published in an English newspaper.26 0 A Maryland court nevertheless refused to enforce the U.K.
254 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-621(b) (7) (2009) (amending the state's version
of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act to provide for nonenforcement of foreign libel judgments "unless a court sitting in this State first determines that the [foreign] defamation law . .. provides at least as much protection for
freedom of speech and the press as provided for by both the United States and Illinois
Constitutions").
255 H.R. 2765, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
256 S. 449, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). To the
extent that the bills purport to assert jurisdiction over any person who has brought a
foreign lawsuit against a "United States person," they may violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 108-16 (1987) (discussing the minimum contacts necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants).
257 See Rosen, supra note 251, at 176-79 (noting that under conflicts-of-law and
constitutional principles, U.S. courts almost always enforce foreign judgments).
258 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs §§ 149, 150 (1971) (pointing
to the place of publication and the victim's domicile, respectively).
259 Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 232 (Md. 1997).
260 Id.
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judgment, because it found that Maryland and U.K. defamation law
were rooted in fundamental public policy differences concerning protection for allegedly libelous speech. 26 1 The only connection with the
United States in that particular case was the fact that the judgment
debtor had moved to the United States and had assets there. 26 2
Recent state laws and congressional proposals would impose flat
bans on recognition of foreign libel judgments, without regard to any
balancing of the territorial and sovereign interests of the respective
nations. The additional and substantial deterrent of private damages
actions in some congressional proposals is clearly intended to prevent
foreign plaintiffs from filing libel claims in forums outside the United
States, where Sullivan's protections do not apply. Although the
United States has a substantial interest in protecting domestic authors
and publishers from unfair or unwarranted foreign judgments, extraterritorial application of the First Amendment is not the only or perhaps most appropriate means of pursuing that interest. British libel
law may be moving closer to protective First Amendment standards. 263
Moreover, multilateral treaties regarding enforcement of foreign
judgments might produce a more coherent and legitimate approach
to the treatment of foreign libel judgments by U.S. courts and
legislatures.
As things stand, U.S. judicial and legislative approaches to libel
tourism may effectively render Sullivan applicable to the entire world.
As Mark Rosen observes: "Categorically refusing to enforce such UnAmerican Judgments is tantamount to imposing U.S. constitutional
norms on foreign countries." 264 The extraterritorial application of
Sullivan may be viewed by other nations as a form of rights imperialism. It also raises an important question regarding how the First
Amendment ought to be characterized. As one commentator put it,
the refusal to enforce foreign libel judgments (and, one might add,
efforts to deter them in the first place) may render the First Amend-

261 Id. at 249-50.
262 Id. at 232.
263 See Marin Roger Scordato, The InternationalLegal Environmentfor Serious Political
Reporting Has Fundamentally Changed: Understandingthe Revolutionary New Era of English
Defamation Law, 40 CONN. L. REV. 165, 206 (2007) (discussing recent changes in British defamation law); Sarah Lyall, England, Long a Libel Mecca, Reviews Laws, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 11, 2009, at Al (reporting that British lawmakers are considering rewriting country's libel laws).
264 Rosen, supra note 251, at 172.
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ment "a universal declaration of human rights rather than a limitation
designed specifically for American civil government." 2 6 5
C.

Exporting First Amendment Values and Norms

Application of domestic law to foreign speech and refusal to
enforce foreign judgments that do not comport with the First Amendment extend the reach or territorial domain of the First Amendment
to some extent. There are several other ways in which First Amendment commitments, values, and norms can be applied beyond U.S.
territorial borders.
The federal government may use its foreign affairs and spending
powers to encourage other nations to adopt First Amendment principles and standards. Rather than impose First Amendment standards
on foreign actors, the government may attempt to persuade other
nations to adopt First Amendment norms. For example, after World
War II the United States engaged in an ultimately unsuccessful
attempt to export First Amendment press principles across the globe
through the United Nations. 2 66 It has also funded the development
and dissemination of communications technologies abroad, in the
hope that this will facilitate free speech, association, and democratic
governance on a First Amendment model.26 7
Diplomatic activities, including application of various types of
international pressure and persuasion, may gradually result in exportation of U.S. free speech principles. For example, the United States
may refuse to sign a treaty or multinational agreement that it deems to
be inconsistent with First Amendment values and commitments. It
may refuse to send representatives to international conferences whose
underlying purpose it deems to be incompatible with First Amendment norms. More affirmatively, the United States has recently articulated a vision of making Internet freedom a plank of its foreign
policy.26 8 Government officials and nongovernmental activists frequently lobby nations to alter their speech rules. This has occurred,
265

Craig A. Stern, ForeignJudgments and the Freedom of Speech: Look Who's Talking, 60
L. REv. 999, 1036 (1994).
See generally MARGARET A. BLANCHARD, EXPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

BROOK.

266
(1986).
267 See BOLLINGER, supra note 4, at 102-03 (discussing U.S. investment in international broadcast channels, including Voice of America); Mark Landler, U.S. Hopes
Exports of Internet Services Will Help Open Closed Societies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, at A4
(reporting on Obama administration's efforts to allow export of online services to
Iran, Cuba, and Sudan).
268 Mark Landler, Clinton Makes Casefor Internet Freedom as a Plank of American Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A6.
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for example, in response to the libel tourism phenomenon. In these
contexts, the First Amendment may be exported through a process of
persuasion, competition, and comparison with other speech regimes.
U.S. officials may also seek to impose First Amendment standards
and norms on citizens who travel and work abroad. Consider, for
example, the Global Online Freedom Act of 2007269 (GOFA), a bill
introduced in the House of Representatives. GOFA was a response to
news reports that American businesses were assisting repressive
regimes with Internet censorship and privacy violations. Yahoo! Inc.
assisted the Chinese government in efforts to identify (and eventually
convict) a Chinese reporter. 2 70 In 2006, Google announced that it
would offer censored versions of its news and search sites in China. 27 1
Concerned that domestic companies were assisting the repressive Chinese government, legislators sought to restrict or limit the companies'
participation in such activities, which were obviously contrary to U.S.
speech and privacy norms.
GOFA sought to define certain standards that domestic companies must meet when operating in "Internet-restricting countries."2 7 2
The law, which would authorize both civil and criminal penalties,
would limit storage by U.S. companies of certain personal data within
such countries and would also limit any disclosures of such information.27 3 GOFA would also establish a new agency, the Office of Global
Internet Freedom (OGIF), within the U.S. State Department. 274 The
law would provide that any filtering or content censoring by U.S. companies that is undertaken at the request of an Internet-restricting
country must be disclosed to OGIF.2 7 5 GOFA would also prohibit U.S.
companies from participating in any Internet jamming of U.S.-supported websites or content in these countries. 276 The law would provide for a private right of action in any U.S. federal court for any
269 H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (2007).
270 Tom Zeller Jr., To Go Global, Do You Ignore Censorship?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2005, at C3.
271 See William J. Cannici, Jr., Note, The Global Online Freedom Act: A Critique of Its
Objectives, Methods, and UltimateEffectiveness CombatingAmerican Businesses That Facilitate
Internet Censorship in the People's Republic of China, 32 SETON HAlL LEGIs. J. 123, 124-25
(2007) (recounting events leading up to the proposal of GOFA).
272 GOFA requires that a list be made of such countries, based upon evidence that
"the government of the country is directly or indirectly responsible for a systematic
pattern of substantial restrictions on Internet freedom during the preceding 1-year
period." H.R. 275, § 105(a) (2).
273 Id. § 201.
274 Id. § 104.
275 Id. §§ 203-204.
276 Id. § 205.
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person whose identifying information has been disclosed to an official
in an Internet-restricting country, with the potential for recovery of
punitive damages. 2 77
The findings section of the bill indicates that the drafters and
sponsors of GOFA perceive First Amendment freedoms as fundamental human rights, applicable without regard to territorial borders.
GOFA's findings express support for the "fundamental human rights"
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 2 7 8 They rely specifically upon Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 7 9
which guarantees freedom to "'receive and impart information and
ideas through any media regardless offrontiers.' "280 Of course, because
Google, Yahoo! Inc., and other technology companies are not state
actors, the drafters could not rely directly upon the First Amendment
in imposing GOFA's obligations and limitations. They relied instead
on what the findings refer to as the "moral responsibility" of these
companies to comply with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 28 1 But there is some indication that the drafters and sponsors
of the law viewed the First Amendment as operating without regard to
territorial borders. The ultimate finding states: "The United States
supports the universal right to freedom of speech and freedom of the
press." 28 2 There would seem to be little doubt that the freedoms
GOFA contemplates are commensurate with those protected by the
First Amendment.
These are merely some examples of the various ways in which
U.S. officials may seek to extend First Amendment norms and principles abroad without formally applying or extending U.S. laws. Note
that in these specific contexts the First Amendment liberties of U.S.
citizens and resident aliens are not directly at stake. Rather, U.S. officials are seeking to extend First Amendment norms and principles
beyond U.S. borders pursuant to a broad national policy of exporting
liberty. They are generally acting out of concern for foreign, rather
than domestic, speakers and audiences.

277 Id. § 202(c).
278 Id. § 2(1).
279 G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 12, 1948).
280 H.R. 275, § 2(1) (emphasis added) (quoting Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 279, art. 19, at 75).
281 Id. § 2(13).
282 Id. § 2(17).
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Does the First Amendment Follow the Flag?

Thus far, I have discussed rather limited exportation of First
Amendment laws and principles, based primarily upon the domestic
effects of foreign speech or a desire to propagate free speech norms
beyond U.S. borders. The principal concern has been whether the
First Amendment framework protects domestic speakers and intellectual property owners from foreign laws and conduct. I have also
raised the question whether the First Amendment might be characterized as a universal human right rather than a domestic limitation. In
this section, I will consider whether the negative First Amendment
applies beyond U.S. borders. In other words, do First Amendment
guarantees constrain the federal government anywhere outside the
United States?28 5 If so, where? And who, if anyone, may claim the
protections of the First Amendment while abroad?
The precise nature of the Constitution's territorial scope or
domain has been a critical-and vexing-question since the framing.284 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether the
First Amendment, in particular, applies beyond U.S. borders. Recall
that in Haig v. Agee,2 5 t.he Court rather grudgingly assumed that the
First Amendment protected a citizen's speech interests as they related
to international travel. 286 A few courts have made a similar assumption with regard to U.S. press freedoms abroad.28 7
283 I shall leave aside the intraterritorial concern regarding application of the First
Amendment inside U.S. territories. In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), one of
the so-called Insular Cases, the Court strongly implied in dictum that the First Amendment applied in unincorporated territories. Id. at 277. The Insular Cases, which were
decided in the early twentieth century, addressed whether various constitutional
restrictions applied in the acquired territories-Florida, Hawaii, the Philippines, and
Puerto Rico. See generally Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes, 182 U.S.
244.
284 See generally Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 3 (1990) (discussing "constitutional uncertainties, frictions, and dissatisfactions that beset" the United States in conducting foreign affairs); NEUMAN, Supra note
44, at 44-71 (outlining the American constitutional foundation of immigration law
and aliens' rights); RAUSTIALA, supra note 230 (exploring the concept of territoriality
and its historical evolution in American law from the founding era to the present);
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002)
(examining the history of inherent powers over foreign affairs and the Supreme
Court's ratification of this doctrine in late nineteenth-century decisions).
285 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
286 Id. at 308.
287 See, e.g., Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 180 F. Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting
that "in an appropriate case" the press may assert a First Amendment right to gather
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Extension of First Amendment protections to U.S. citizens
located abroad would seem to be supported by text, theory, and precedent. The First Amendment's text does not suggest any geographic
limitation.28 8 One or more of the principal justifications for First
Amendment protection, including truth seeking, 2 89 self-governance, 290 and self-actualization, 29 1 would seem to support the application of First Amendment protections to citizens (and perhaps legal
resident aliens) located abroad. Moreover, currentjudicial interpretations of constitutional domain strongly suggest that U.S. citizens, at
least, do not forfeit all First Amendment protections simply by crossing the territorial border.29 2
From 1891 to 1957, few questioned the Supreme Court's statement in In re Ross 293 that "[t] he Constitution can have no operation in
another country." 294 But after the United States became a superpower and extended its domain to various occupied territories, the
Bill of Rights gradually became decoupled from traditional notions of
territorial sovereignty.2 9 5 Since the mid-1950s, the territorial domain
of constitutional liberties, including those set forth in the Bill of
Rights, has steadily expanded with respect to both citizens and
aliens.2 96 As Kal Raustiala has observed, "legal spatiality"-the notion
that rights vary with location-has become a disfavored concept in a
variety of legal contexts.2 9 7
information abroad); Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1572
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (declining to articulate the scope of any press freedoms abroad).
288 U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . .").
289 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
290 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing for broad protection of the freedom of speech due to the fact
that governments derive their power from the people).
291 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 964, 966, 990-1009 (1978) (defending the self-actualization justification).
292 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he shield
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect [a
citizen's] life and liberty should not be stripped away just because [the citizen] happens to be in another land.").

293 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
294 Id. at 464.
295 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: IndividualRights
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11, 21 (1985) (explaining the relationship between the expansion of U.S. power and the domain of constitutional
liberties).
296 See Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2501, 2516-17
(2005).
297 Id. at 2504.
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In Reid v. Covert,2 9 8 the Court rejected the idea that citizens' constitutional liberties were strictly confined to U.S. territory.2 99 Reid
held that the guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied
to the wife of an American serviceman accused of murder and subjected to a court-martial in England.3 0 0 A plurality in Reid dismissed
In re Ross as "a relic from a different era."3 0 1 Justice Black, writing for
a plurality in Reid, stated: "When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another
land." 302
The most recent rejection of constitutional spatiality occurred in
Boumediene v. Bush,3 03 which held that the habeas guarantee extended
to aliens being held beyond U.S. territorial borders.3 0 4 The
Boumediene Court again admonished that "[e]ven when the United
States acts outside its borders, its powers are not 'absolute and unlimited' but are subject 'to such restrictions as are expressed in the
Constitution.' "305
Neither Reid nor Boumediene held, however, that the entire Bill of
Rights was applicable abroad. Reid also suggested that constitutional
guarantees do not apply with equal force when citizens were located
outside U.S. territorial borders. In a reprise of the incorporation
debate, some of the opinions suggested that the Bill of Rights might
apply only partially and contingently.3 0 6 Thus, although they may be
applicable overseas, First Amendment guarantees may be somewhat
less robust depending on the practical necessities and contingencies
associated with specific locations and contexts.30 7 In sum, following
Reid and Boumediene, it is likely that the First Amendment applies to
298

354 U.S. 1 (1957).

299

See id. at 5-6 (plurality opinion) ("The United States is entirely a creature of

the Constitution.... It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by
the Constitution.").
300 Id. at 18-19.
301 Id. at 12.
302 Id. at 6.
303 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
304 Id. at 2262.
305 Id. at 2259 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)).
306 While Justice Black's opinion would have applied the Bill of Rights in toto,
Reid, 354 U.S. at 9 (plurality opinion), Justices Frankfurter and Harlan would have
applied the Bill of Rights more selectively, see id. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
id. at 75-76 (Harlan, J., concurring).
307 See Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that
First Amendment guarantees are less robust in the overseas military context).
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citizens abroad, although the extent of the application may turn on
functional and contextual considerations.3 0 8
This conclusion is consistent with some lower court opinions. For
example, in a case involving speech restrictions imposed on U.S.
soldiers located on military bases during the Vietnam conflict, the
D.C. Circuit assumed that First Amendment protections applied at
least to some degree.3 0 9 More recently, the Seventh Circuit applied
First Amendment standards to a citizen's claim that travel restrictions
had punished him for engaging in a foreign war protest.3 10
The more difficult question concerns the extraterritorial application of First Amendment guarantees to aliens abroad.3 1 Courts and
scholars have articulated several different approaches to determining
the territorial scope of constitutional guarantees, including the Bill of
Rights. 3 1 2 As Gerald Neuman has recently explained,313 three basic
approaches may be gleaned from the opinions in Reid and United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,3 14 which held that Fourth Amendment protections did not apply to the search of an alien's property in
Mexico. 3 1 5
One approach is to apply the Bill of Rights in foreign territories
only to U.S. citizens and not foreign nationals.3 16 In Verdugo-Urquidez,
the Court concluded that noncitizens "can derive no comfort from
the Reid holding."3 1 7 A plurality of the Court found it significant that
the Fourth Amendment refers to "the people"-language they con308 See Gerald L. Neuman, The ExtraterritorialConstitution After Boumediene v.
Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 259, 282 (2009).
309 See Carlson, 511 F.2d at 1331-33 (applying time, place, and manner standards
to soldiers' petitioning activities).
310 See Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 559 F.3d 595, 605 (7th Cir.
2009) (applying First Amendment standards to citizen's anti-war protest in Iraq).
311 Again, the rights of aliens located within the United States shall be set aside as
a matter relating to the intraterritorial First Amendment.
312 See NEUMAN, supra note 44, at 5-8 (describing the universalism, membership,
mutuality, and global due process approaches); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and
the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2017, 2042-59 (2005)
(describing various approaches to extraterritoriality).
313 See Neuman, supra note 308, at 285.
314 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
315 Id. at 274-75.
316 Gerald L. Neuman, ExtraterritorialRights and Constitutional Methodology After
Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2073, 2076-77 (2005).
317 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270. With regard to noncitizens located abroad,
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez also indicated that extension of
Fourth Amendment rights required some "previous significant voluntary connection
with the United States." Id. at 271. Aliens that have entered the United States, meanwhile, are entitled to some constitutional protections-whether they have entered

15g6

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:4

cluded would preclude application of the Fourth Amendment to
aliens.31 8 The First Amendment contains the same language,
although one could argue that it applies only to the right of
assembly.sis
The citizenship or membership approach has been adopted by
some lower courts reviewing aliens' First Amendment claims. For
example, foreign nongovernmental family planning organizations
have challenged U.S. funding policies relating to family planning. 320
In DKT MemorialFund Ltd. v. Agency for InternationalDevelopment,3 2 1 the
District of Columbia Circuit dismissed First Amendment claims
brought by foreign organizations that were prohibited during the
period of any federal grant from using their own funds to perform or
promote abortion as a method of family planning abroad. 322 Such a
restriction would violate the First Amendment if applied to domestic
organizations. 323
Relying primarily on the alien exclusion cases discussed in Part I,
the court held that the foreign organizations lacked standing to assert
any First Amendment claims because they possessed no constitutional
rights while they were located outside the United States and were not
within the custody or control of U.S. officials.3 2 4 Although not reaching the extraterritoriality question on the merits, then-Judge Ginsburg, after quoting the position of the Third Restatement of Foreign
legally or not. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001) (citing cases involving the constitutional rights of aliens).
318 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-266. Justice Kennedy disagreed that "the
people" restricted the Fourth Amendment's geographic domain. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
319 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the
).
right of the people peaceably to assemble ....
320 Since 1984, the United States has intermittently adopted family planning policies that restrict the use of federal aid for abortion-related counseling and services.
See Nina J. Crimm, The Global Gag Rule: Undermining National Interests by Doing unto
Foreign Women and NGOs What Cannot Be Done at Home, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 587,
592-608 (2007) (describing the background of the abortion "global gag rule").
Courts have generally upheld the policy against constitutional attacks by domestic
organizations, reasoning that the federal government may insist pursuant to its spending power that organizations not fund abortion-related services with federal funds.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 915 F.2d 59,
65 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding federal anti-abortion aid policy).
321 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
322 Id. at 278.
323 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (invalidating
rule that conditioned federal funding on the speakers' agreement not to editorialize,
even with private funds).
324 DKT Mem' Fund, 887 F.2d at 285.
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Relations Law of the United States325 that constitutional rights apply
regardless of location, stated in her partial dissent that she "would
hesitate long before holding that in a United States-foreign citizen
encounter, the amendment we prize as 'first' has no force in court."3 2 6
A more functional and flexible approach, posited in concurrences by Justices Harlan and Frankfurter in Reid, and echoed byJustice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, would
base extraterritorial application of constitutional liberties, such as
those in the First Amendment, on contextual matters, such as "the
particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives which Congress had before it."327 This functional
approach gained additional currency in Boumediene, which held that
the writ of habeas corpus extended to alien detainees being held at
Guantanamo, a territory under the control of the United States but
over which it did not exercise sovereignty.3 28 Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy applied a multifactor approach similar to that articulated in the Reid concurrences to determine the scope or domain of
the habeas guarantee. The relevant factors included the nature and
degree of control the United States exercises over the territory in
question, the importance of the writ itself, the status of the detainees,
the location of the arrests and detentions, and any practical obstacles
to administration of the writ.3 29
A third approach to extraterritoriality is worth mentioning.
Some justices and commentators favor a "mutuality of obligation"
approach, which essentially links extraterritorial enjoyment of constitutional liberties with the assertion of an obligation to obey U.S.
law.3 s0 This approach, which has never commanded a majority of the
Court, would extend most protections of the Bill of Rights-presumably including those in the First Amendment-to both citizens and

325 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721
(1987).
326 DKT Mem' Fund, 887 F.2d at 308 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
327 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(highlighting the impracticability of applying the warrant requirement to a search
conducted by U.S. officials in Mexico).
328 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
329 Id. at 2244, 2255, 2259.
330 Neuman, supra note 316, at 2077.
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noncitizens, wherever located, if they are under U.S. control or subject to U.S. laws. 33 '
Under current approaches to constitutional domain, it is likely
that citizens enjoy at least some limited First Amendment protections
when outside U.S. territorial borders. Whether First Amendment
guarantees follow the flag more generally remains an open question.
After Boumediene, it is at least plausible to argue that the First Amendment protects aliens abroad in some circumstances. In order to make
the argument for extraterritorial application stronger, however, some
theoretical groundwork must be laid. This theoretical gap will be
addressed in greater detail in Part III.
III.

OUR LESS TERRITORIAL, AND MORE COSMOPOLITAN,
FRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment remains territorial in certain traditional
respects. Borders continue to serve as important markers of the
domain of free speech, press, and other First Amendment guarantees.
But the First Amendment has become far less territorial at, and perhaps even beyond, the nation's borders. As a result of legislative, regulatory, judicial, political, and social changes, the First Amendment is
becoming more cosmopolitan in character and orientation. Political
and judicial interpretations of the First Amendment have become less
insular in nature and more facilitative of cross-border information
flow. Owing to digitization and globalization, the First Amendment is
part of a renewed and vigorous international dialogue regarding freedom of information. In short, de-territorialization has rendered the
boundaries and domain of the First Amendment less certain.
There are, however, various obstacles to further movement in this
more cosmopolitan direction.3 3 2 These include fundamental interests
relating to state sovereignty, diplomatic limitations, and theoretical
gaps regarding the justification for a more robust or expansive extraterritorial First Amendment. Moreover, we ought to consider how
cosmopolitanism might bend territorial borders in the opposite direction. Importation of foreign speech standards and norms may ultimately pose some threat to the First Amendment's intraterritorial
331 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
when the United States imposes obligations on foreign nationals to obey its laws, the
government is obligated to respect rights).
332 1 have attempted in this Article to describe the present-day relationship
between territory and the First Amendment. I take no normative position with regard
to the value of open borders or the diminishing salience of territoriality. Rather, I
seek here only to assess the prospects for further liberalization of the territorial First
Amendment and expansion of the First Amendment's territorial domain.
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domain, thus rendering the First Amendment cosmopolitan in the
sense that it is subject to foreign influences.
A.

Soft Borders, Cross-BorderInformation Flow, and Sovereignty

As we have seen, the territorial framework that governs cross-border information exchange, which was developed at the founding and
fortified by twentieth century war and ideological conflicts, remains
largely intact today. But as a result of legal liberalization and digitization, U.S. borders have become appreciably "softer" barriers to the
cross-border exchange of persons, ideas, and information. This softening of U.S. borders implicates, but does not threaten to destroy,
U.S. sovereignty. De-territorialization is by no means destined to continue. But there are many forces that will likely continue to push the
First Amendment in a more cosmopolitan direction.
1. Legal and Regulatory Liberalization
The core of the territorial First Amendment has been remarkably
stable during the past century. As discussed in Part I, aliens still have
no constitutional right of ingress. U.S. citizens possess only a limited
right to travel for expressive purposes-a liberty that may be denied
for national security or foreign policy reasons. Federal officials retain
the same expansive border search authority granted by the very first

Congress. By virtue of their location, searches and seizures of expressive materials are considered presumptively reasonable at the border
and its functional equivalent. Finally, U.S. law continues to restrict
certain cross-border contacts in the name of national security.
These and other basic territorial limitations have been with us
time out of mind. Owing to their centrality to state sovereignty and
territorial governance, it is perhaps no surprise that these aspects of
the territorial First Amendment have not yet yielded to the forces of
modernization. That does not mean, of course, that the First Amendment cannot play a more prominent role in opening borders to crossborder travel and protection of informational materials at the border.
In any event, today cross-border information exchange is subject to
fewer restrictions than perhaps at any time in the nation's history.
Legal and regulatory liberalization, along with the rapid digitization
of expression, has facilitated cross-border exchanges, information
flow, and cultural mixing. Territorial borders have been transformed
from hard to relatively soft barriers.
Legal liberalization actually began in the late 1950s, when the
Supreme Court first held that the right of a citizen to travel abroad
could not be denied under existing passport laws and regulations
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based solely upon an applicant's ideology.33 3 In 1965, the Court held
that citizens had a right under the First Amendment to receive information, including communist political propaganda, from foreign
sources. 3 34 In these decisions, the Court signaled that a policy of strict
isolationism with respect to foreign ideas was inconsistent with Fifth
and First Amendment values.
These were hopeful signs that America was shaking off its insular
past. As we have seen, however, the federal government continued in
ensuing decades to restrict cross-border informational exchange
(based in many cases on the content of the materials) and immigration (including on purely ideological grounds). But as discussed in
Part I, as a result of legislative amendments, changes to executive
enforcement policies, and some court decisions during the 1990s, a
broad category of "informational materials" were eventually exempted
from content-based territorial regulations. In addition, travel and
trade regulations were substantially liberalized by exempting or licensing journalistic, academic, artistic, and other core First Amendment
pursuits.3 3 5 Some longstanding travel and trade embargoes have been
lifted or moderated. At this moment, there is even substantial political support for lifting travel restrictions that have prohibited cross-border exchanges with Cuba for many decades. Legislators and
regulators have also substantially amended cross-border trade provisions in an effort to facilitate scientific and educational information
sharing.3 3 6 As a result, the categories of materials subject to territorial
restrictions have been steadily shrinking.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. officials have also relied less
on ideology as a basis for cross-border regulation. Decreased reliance
on ideological exclusions has primarily been the result of political
rather than judicial decisions. Federal laws and regulations expressly
prohibit officials from basing certain immigration and regulatory decisions solely upon viewpoint or ideology.3 3 7 To be sure, the executive
continues to maintain that the First Amendment does not prohibit
exclusion of aliens based solely upon their beliefs or associations.
However, no presidential administration has expressly invoked such
authority since the 1980s. This is truly remarkable, particularly in
light of the fact that some Western democracies publicly trumpet ide333 See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (concluding that the passport
laws did not delegate to the Secretary the power to withhold passports based on
beliefs or associations).
334 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
335 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
336 See supra Parts I.C.4-5.
337 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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ological exclusions as a means of signaling their disapproval of certain
beliefs.3 3 8 In sum, ideology has played a declining role at the nation's
borders during the past few decades.
Although many significant amendments of territorial laws and
regulations resulted from political decisions, courts have played at
least a minor role in softening U.S. border controls. Some laws and
regulations were amended in response to particular judicial decisions.3 3 9 To be sure, there has been no sea change in the deferential
manner in which courts review territorial policies relating to cross-border exchanges that touch upon foreign affairs, national security, and
immigration. The First Amendment still applies differently at the borders (and their functional equivalents) than it does intraterritorially.
Nevertheless, beginning in the late 1980s, some courts began to
acknowledge that speech, association, and other First Amendment
guarantees were not isolated domestic concerns. The notion that the
First Amendment does not apply at all, or applies with only minimal
force, at and beyond our borders is not as dogmatically accepted by
courts today as it was in the years leading up to globalization. Further
"domestication" of the First Amendment scrutiny applied to remaining cross-border restrictions may lead to even greater liberalization of
cross-border information exchange.3 4 0
The gradual softening of U.S. borders did not take place in isolation or result solely from domestic concerns. It was the product of
what one scholar has referred to as "a growing consensus in the community of states to lift border controls for the flow of capital, information, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization."3 4 1
New threats arising from cross-border exchanges, including terrorist
activity and financial misconduct, have created additional regulatory
challenges. But they do not appear to have undermined or eliminated the basic consensus, at least among liberal constitutional
democracies, that cross-border information exchange ought to be
encouraged and facilitated.
Border softening by means of legal and regulatory liberalization
appears likely to continue on several fronts. As mentioned, Congress
may soon revise or repeal travel restrictions that affect cross-border
expression, inquiry, and association.3 4 2 The Supreme Court has been
338 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
339 See Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating
content-based customs exemptions regulations).
340 See generally Roth, supra note 19, at 257 (urging "domestication" of limits on
citizens' participation in foreign affairs).
341 SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? 59 (1996).
342 See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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asked to invalidate or at least narrow federal laws that limit the provision of basic advice and assistance to certain foreign organizations. 34 3
The nation's cross-border trade regulations have also come under
increasing scrutiny by lawmakers and regulated industries. Owing to
concerns regarding U.S. competitiveness in global markets, high-tech
and other industries have lobbied aggressively for further liberalization or elimination of various trade restrictions, including the
"deemed export" rules discussed in Part I.344 New threats or foreign
policy initiatives may result in some tightening of border controls.
But in an increasingly globalized commercial and political marketplace, hard territorial borders will likely be increasingly unsustainable.
If not fully destroyed, the "nylon curtain"3 45 that once hung over
U.S. borders now lies substantially in tatters. Our borders are certainly not open, in the sense that persons, information, and materials
may enter without limitation. Although fear of foreign persons and
ideas has dissipated, it remains part of the First Amendment's territorial framework to some degree. Nor is it the case that the First
Amendment applies with equal force at national and international
borders as it does within the United States. The First Amendment will
likely never be post-territorial in that broad sense. But as a legal or
formal matter, U.S. borders are generally more open to expression,
informational exchange, and a diversity of ideologies and viewpoints
than they have ever been. Although many of the liberalizing decisions
of the past few decades have been political rather than judicial or constitutional, most are not likely to be reversed. In addition to serving
U.S. commercial interests, de-territorialization is consistent with U.S.
international obligations to guarantee the free flow of information
without regard to frontiers.
2.

Digitization and Territoriality

The liberalization of cross-border information exchange is not
solely the product of legal and regulatory amendments. As a formal
matter, the United States still purports to control information flow at
its borders. As a practical matter, however, the digitization of speech
and communication technologies like the Internet pose substantial
343 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted sub nom., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 48
(2009).
344 See supra notes 162-77 and accompanying text; see also Cornelia Dean & William J. Broad, Obama Is Urged to Open High-Tech Exports, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2009, at A12
(reporting that the National Academy of Sciences is concerned that export and immigration controls are harming American innovation and economic competitiveness).
345 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 719.
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challenges to the territorial model of information control. It is one
thing to prevent the entry of harmful persons, packages, and other
tangible materials into the United States. It is quite another to stop
bits and bytes at territorial borders.
Indeed, some scholars have claimed that digitization and the
Internet will eliminate territorial sovereignty, and with it, territorial
control of cross-border information flow.3 4 6 As noted earlier, these
exceptionalists view the Internet as a space that is not subject to traditional claims of territorial sovereignty. 347 In their view, all law that
applies to Internet communications and transactions is essentially
post-territorial. Skeptics of the post-territorial thesis argue that digitization has not altered territorial governance in general, or the territorial First Amendment. 348
The truth lies somewhere in the middle of these extreme positions. Insofar as speech and association are concerned, digitization
has not eliminated the territorial First Amendment. The United
States continues to monitor and sometimes block cross-border
exchanges, particularly those that implicate national security.34* This
occurs regardless of the form or means of communication. As well,
some contacts and collaborations are primarily physical in nature; in
these instances, virtual contact and information exchange are simply
not adequate substitutes. Still, these instances are increasingly the
exception rather than the norm. In general, the migration of human
contact and information exchange to virtual spaces has significantly
undermined the traditional territorial approach to regulating speech,
press, and association.
Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu have argued that while digitization
and the Internet have altered the methods by which governments control cross-border expression and informational exchange, they have
not brought about the demise of territorial governance itself.3 50 Goldsmith and Wu argue that far from being a borderless space, the
346 See David R.Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1372 (1996) ("[E]fforts to control the flow of electronic
information across physical borders-to map local regulation and physical boundaries onto Cyberspace-are likely to prove futile . . . .").
347 See PosT, supra note 219, at 166-69 (distinguishing between "unexceptionalists," who argue that Internet transactions are subject to traditional territorial regulation, and "exceptionalists," who argue that the Internet is a distinct space not subject
to traditional territorial rules).
348 See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 49-65; see also Jack L. Goldsmith,
Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1212-50 (1998) (challenging regulation
skeptics).

349
350

See supra Part I.C.4.
See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 70.
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Internet has developed such that geography and place (location)
remain critical to the regulation of cross-border expression.35 1 Their
central claim is that governments continue to regulate speech, information, and commerce territorially, although they now do so by focusing on the activities of local "intermediaries" like Internet service
providers, search engines, and browsers within sovereign territories.3 5 2
Thus, although U.S. regulators and officials can neither see individual
communications as they come across the border, nor directly control
the foreign originators of many of these communications, Goldsmith
and Wu argue that they can effectively regulate transactions and
expression by controlling the domestic intermediaries over which they
exercise regulatory authority.3 5 3 Further, as they always have, officials
can target individuals within their borders to influence the supply of,
and demand for, offending commerce and expression.3 54
According to Goldsmith and Wu, the transmission of digitized
speech via the Internet has merely prompted officials to shift their
regulatory focus from the international border to domestic locations.35 5 They observe that place or location still matters to cross-border exchanges, in the sense that websites often inquire where users
are located in order to provide specialized services or appropriate languages. 3 5 6 Similarly, they note that "the efficacy of Internet communications depends on the real-space location of both data and the
underlying Internet hardware through which the data travel."3 5 7 Contrary to predictions that distance has been vanquished by a borderless
cyberspace, Goldsmith and Wu point out that Internet efficacy,
whether in terms of communication or commerce, depends on substantial concentrations of resources and people in real physical
places. 58
Goldsmith and Wu concede that a domestic enforcement strategy
cannot prevent all harmful or illegal digitized speech from crossing
351 See id. at 62-63 ("[G]eography remains crucially important, especially in the
Internet era.").
352 See id. at 68-72 (explaining the regulation of Internet sources, intermediaries,
and targets).
353 Id. at 70.
354 See id. at 79-80 (discussing the strategy of targeting individuals).
355 See id. at 65-85.
356 Id. at 49.
357 Id. at 54; see SAsmIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AuTHoRI, RIGIrrs 343 (2006) (arguing
that new communications technologies "will not inevitably globalize users and eliminate their articulation with particular localities, but they will make globality a resource
for these users").
358

GOLDSMTTI & Wu, supra note 16, at 56-58.
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territorial borders.359 This is obviously also true of the more traditional territorial regulatory model described in Part 1. Indeed, it may
be that more traditional border control enforcement strategies are less
effective than those described by Goldsmith and Wu. In some cases,
such as export controls on dual-use materials, the penalties for noncompliance may be substantial enough to have a significant deterrent
effect. But in other contexts, including enforcement of prohibitions
on the importation of obscene materials, a territorial approach seems
almost futile in the digital era.3 60 Ultimately, Goldsmith and Wu
claim that domestic enforcement strategies will "succeed [ ] by lowering the incidence of prohibited activities to an acceptable degree."3 6 1
The claim is difficult to assess empirically; among other things, the
authors do not suggest how we might quantify or prove an "acceptable
degree" of deterrence.
In any event, note that according to Goldsmith and Wu's
account, it is clear that territorial borders themselves have become less
salient features of the regulation of cross-border exchanges. The
domestic enforcement strategy is not based primarily upon preventing
transmission of illegal or harmful content across the border. Borders
themselves remain salient in the regulatory sense, but only insofar as
one conceives of them as having been pushed inward to intraterritorial locations over which some sovereign exercises territorial control.3 6 2 In many circumstances, the foreign speaker's content will
actually reach its intended audience. Rather than suppressing content at the border by means of a national filter or some other technological mechanism, most governments will be forced to rely upon ex
post measures geared toward shutting down intermediaries and
preventing future dissemination.3 63
It is not entirely clear that regulation that occurs some place
other than the physical border ought to be described as "territorial."
Goldsmith and Wu focus on the domestic effects of the expression,
which clearly fall within the territorial sovereignty of the recipient
359 Id. at 81.
360 Goldsmith and Wu concede that regulation will be imperfect for any number
of reasons, including the size of the nation, the evasive actions of intermediaries, and
the unwillingness of some countries (like the United States) to regulate for fear of
suppressing legal speech or conduct. Id. at 81-84.
361 Id. at 81.
362 Cf Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. CIv.
RTs. & Civ. LIBERTIES 165 (2007) (discussing shifting concepts of the territorial border with regard to immigration enforcement).
363 See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 92-95 (describing China's very elaborate territorial cyber-barriers).
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nation. U.S. officials have used this conception of territorial sovereignty to regulate everything from trademark violations, to sharing
computer code, to terrorist financing of foreign entities. Perhaps we
must reconceptualize the "territorial border" to account for new circumstances. In the immigration context, for example, the "border" is
treated as a flexible concept that does not necessarily comport with
cartographic facts. 36 4 Thus, immigrants who have already crossed the
physical border may be treated as if they are still situated at the international border.
Similarly, digitized expression and information that has in fact
already crossed international borders undetected may be viewed as
not legitimately present. This sort of conceptual manipulation masks
a significant territorial fact: namely, that borders can no longer function as relatively hard funnel points for cross-border expression. Modern delivery systems generally bypass or ignore borders, or speech is
there so fleetingly that it cannot be controlled at the moment of entry.
In sum, although unexceptionalists are correct that, as both a legal
and practical matter, nations retain territorial sovereignty despite digitization, exceptionalists are also correct that the Internet has undermined traditional territorial regulation of cross-border information
flow.
In the digitized environment, speakers and speech readily cross
territorial borders. Along with legal and regulatory liberalization, the
digitization of speech has fundamentally altered the scope of the First
Amendment by reducing governmental power to bar information and
ideas at the nation's territorial borders. Cross-border communication
and receipt of foreign information have in some respects been unalterably de-territorialized.
3.

Cross-Border Information Flow and "Interdependence
Sovereignty"

Controlling cross-border information flow is an aspect of state
sovereignty. Some might be concerned that a loss of territorial control implies or indicates a loss of sovereignty. Sovereignty concerns
help to explain why the executive refuses to disclaim the power of
ideological exclusion, and why laws and regulations continue to
require licensure of certain types of cross-border speech and contacts.
As the Supreme Court has said, "[i]t is axiomatic that the United
States, as a sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity."3 65 There may.
364
365

See Shachar, supra note 362, at 166.
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004).
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indeed be significant costs associated with a less territorial First
Amendment, among them the cross-border transmission of illegal and
harmful content. But as the events of the past two decades have
demonstrated, the waning of the territorial First Amendment does not
inexorably threaten U.S. sovereignty. Further liberalization of crossborder speech and association ought not to be rejected on sovereignty
grounds.
Stephen Krasner describes the ability "to regulate the flow of
goods, persons, pollutants, diseases, and ideas across territorial
boundaries" as "interdependence sovereignty."3 6 6 In Krasner's typology, this concept of sovereignty is distinct from its domestic, international (legal), and Westphalian meanings.3 6 7 As Krasner notes, some
commentators view the loss of border control occasioned by globalization as a loss of sovereignty.3 68 Krasner agrees that loss of such control
might affect domestic sovereignty, in the sense that "[i] f a state cannot
regulate what passes across its borders, it will not be able to control
what happens within them."3 69 He is justifiably skeptical, however,
that globalization has opened national borders to such an extent that
states have been compromised or unduly strained.3 70 In any event,
Krasner claims that a loss of interdependence sovereignty does not
necessarily compromise legal or Westphalian sovereignty. As he puts
it: "Rulers can lose control of transborder flows and still be recognized
and be able to exclude external actors."3 71
The United States has not generally lost control over cross-border
movement and information exchange. It will, at a minimum, continue to enforce some border controls in order to ensure domestic
security. While the Constitution protects First Amendment liberties,
"it is not a suicide pact."3 72 But such concerns do not necessarily warrant a strong territorial First Amendment. Although territorial borders are much softer than they were a mere two decades ago, the
United States has not suffered any fundamental diminution in international status or domestic order.
U.S. "interdependence" sovereignty has been diminished somewhat, both voluntarily through legal liberalization and as a function of
technological bypasses of traditional border controls. But a less territorial First Amendment, one characterized by borders that are gener366
367
368
369
370
371
372

See KRASNER, supra note 25, at 12.
See id. at 9-25 (discussing four meanings of sovereignty).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).

608

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:4

ally open, ought not to be rejected based upon fears that it portends
the demise of U.S. sovereignty.
B.

Expansion of the First Amendment's TerritorialDomain

There are other important respects in which the First Amendment has become less territorial. As we saw in Part II, officials have
sought through various means to export the First Amendment as a
global norm or universal guarantee. These efforts have included
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws to foreign speech; prohibitions
on domestic enforcement of foreign libel judgments; and foreign
affairs funding, diplomacy, and proposed limits on the information
activities of U.S. workers abroad. Some of the First Amendment's substantive guarantees might also be interpreted to apply to both citizens
and aliens abroad.
Further expansion of the First Amendment's extraterritorial
domain will be difficult to achieve. Exportation of First Amendment
standards, values, and norms may conflict with the sovereign interests
of other states. Thus the United States cannot export its First Amendment regime by simple decree. Moreover, limited extraterritorial
application of U.S. trademark and other speech laws will likely have
little effect on the First Amendment's general domain. Finally,
although there is some jurisprudential support for extraterritorial
application of the First Amendment's negative limitations, there are
several practical and theoretical obstacles to such an expansion. If the
First Amendment's territorial domain is to expand further it will likely
be as a result of funding and regulatory decisions, along with the
more gradual processes of norm transmission and internationalism.3 7 3
As discussed below, however, some worry that these processes may
result in a transnational First Amendment that is more cosmopolitan
in the sense that its substantive standards are influenced by importation of foreign speech regimes. In the meantime, constitutional
democracies will continue to afford different levels of protection to
speech, privacy, press, and association.37 4

373 See generally Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of ConstitutionalLaw, 49
J. INT'L L. 985, 988-95 (2009) (discussing top-down and bottom-up processes
impelling globalization).
374 For a comparative analysis of speech guarantees in several constitutional
democracies, see generally RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRsT AMENDMENT IN
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECrIVE (2006).

VA.

2010]

TERRITORIALITY

AND

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1609

1. Exporting First Amendment Laws, Norms, and Standards
The United States currently engages in a number of activities that
are explicitly designed to expand the First Amendment's territorial
domain.3 75 These range from extraterritorial application of trademark laws, to routine diplomacy, to strict forms of libel protectionism.
As a result of these efforts, the First Amendment is already extraterritorial to a certain extent. There are, however, serious obstacles to further expanding its domain through mechanisms of exportation.
Let us begin with perhaps the least effective means of exporting
the First Amendment. Efforts to prevent domestic entities and their
employees from assisting repressive states are intended to project First
Amendment norms beyond U.S. territory. Recall, for example, that
GOFA included an express finding that freedom of speech is a universal human right.3 7 6 But measures like GOFA, if indeed they are ever
enacted, will not prevent foreign authorities from erecting and
enforcing territorial information barriers. As the situation in China
demonstrates, a sovereign intent on erecting such barriers will find
other means of doing so. Congress can at least ensure that U.S. capital does not contribute to foreign censorship. And it can signal its
strong commitment to freedom of information through foreign policy, funding decisions, and diplomacy. In this sense, measures like
GOFA are strong political statements that the U.S. views First Amendment guarantees as global human rights. But by themselves, they will
likely not expand the First Amendment's territorial domain.
As discussed in Part II, extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. laws
may have a limited impact on foreign speech. Like other nations, the
United States regulates many types of foreign conduct on the ground
that such conduct causes substantial harmful effects within U.S. territory. Speech is no exception to this general regulatory approach. But
for substantive, jurisdictional, and technological reasons, effects-based
regulation is not likely to result in any significant exportation of First
Amendment standards. U.S. laws are generally more liberal than foreign speech laws. Instances in which foreign speech will be protected
abroad but proscribed in the United States will thus be relatively rare.
In jurisdictional terms, U.S. laws can only be applied to foreign speakers who have sufficient domestic contacts with the United States.
Thus, the lone cyber-pamphleteer need not be terribly concerned
about the reach of U.S. speech laws. Finally, foreign speakers are
375
376

See supra Part II.
See Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
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increasingly able, through geographical identification technologies, to
limit the geographic distribution of their Internet communications.3 7 7
As we have seen, U.S. intellectual property laws also have some
extraterritorial reach.3 78 Thus far, however, only trademark laws have
been given any extraterritorial effect-an apparent anomaly that
some lower courts have responded to by generating balancing tests
that limit trademark's extraterritorial application.3 79 There does not
appear to be any current legislative or judicial agenda to extend the
U.S. intellectual property regime to foreign territories. Although
some commentators decry the rigid territorialism of intellectual property laws, extraterritorial expansion in this area will likely occur, if at
all, as a result of the negotiation of treaties rather than through extraterritoriality.3 8 0 Unilateral expansion of the unique U.S. balance with
regard to intellectual property and free speech faces numerous diplomatic and international hurdles.
The drive toward First Amendment globalism has been somewhat
more successful with regard to U.S. libel law. As discussed in Part II,
foreign libel tourism has been met in the United States by a form of
reactive libel protectionism. Contrary to settled principles of foreign
judgment recognition, courts have refused to enforce foreign libel
judgments and legislators have enacted protectionist laws that deny
any legal force to suchjudgments. Libel protectionism effectively supplants the speech laws and policies of other states, giving the First
Amendment "a kind of global constitutional status."3 8 1
Of course, plaintiffs may still obtain and enforce libel judgments
under the laws of foreign forums. Foreign states may also respond
with anti-anti-libel tourism laws that prohibit domestic courts from giving legal effect to U.S. decrees. Insofar as domestic defendants are
concerned, libel protectionism shields U.S. assets by attaching the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan regime to foreign judgments. But in the
long run, meaningful protection from foreign libel laws will only
result from foreign regimes amending their libel laws. To be sure, the
passage of protectionist U.S. laws may play some role in ultimately
defeating libel tourism. The U.S. response to libel tourism has placed
significant pressure on British officials to shift the nation's libel stan377 See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supranote 16, at 59-62 (discussing geographical identification technologies).
378 See supra notes 232-44 and accompanying text.
379 See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text; see also RAUSTIALA, supra note
230, at 111 (noting that intellectual property law remains "resolutely territorial").
380 See RAUSTIALA, supra note 230, at 121 (noting that the United States has not
sought changes in the copyright laws of foreign nations via extraterritoriality).
381 GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 161.
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dards toward the Sullivan regime. Indeed, there are signs that Parliament may modify British libel law in response to concerns regarding
libel tourism.38 2 In the community of states, however, the process of
First Amendment norm transmission will involve persuasion rather
than dictation.38 3 If it is to occur at all, First Amendment globalism
will result from diplomacy, contacts among judges and lawyers of various nations, transnational processes, and the work of nongovernmen-

tal organizations.3

84

Even assuming the First Amendment gains some foreign ground,
it will likely not be the only speech regime that will experience territorial expansion. In the digital age the laws of most nations may have
some extraterritorial force or effect.3 8 5 As we saw in Part II, Yahoo!
Inc. ultimately yielded to the judgment of a French court applying
French law to its activities in the United States. As the Internet
increases cross-border effects, it will also increase the competition
among free speech laws and principles. As discussed below, the First
Amendment may face strong competition from foreign speech
regimes on its own turf.38 6 As Mark Tushnet has observed, there is no
certainty that the speech standards that will emerge from this process
will converge with current First Amendment interpretations. 38 7
The First Amendment's territorial domain has expanded to some
extent through various exportation mechanisms. As a result, domestic
speakers and intellectual property owners have gained some extraterritorial First Amendment protections. More significant expansion of
the First Amendment's territorial domain will take place, if at all, as a
result of carefully considered foreign policy decisions relating to freedom of information; it will generally take place on international stages
rather than in domestic legislatures and courts.38 8
382 See Lyall, supra note 263 (noting the effect of U.S. court decisions and libel
tourism laws on British lawmakers).
383 On constitutional norm transmission generally, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004); Tushnet, supra note 373, at 988-95; Lorraine E.
Weinrib, The PostwarParadigmand American Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
384 See Tushnet, supranote 373, at 988-90 (describing various top-down processes
that may lead to global constitutional harmonization).
385 See GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 16, at 155 ("These inevitable cross-border
effects do not undermine the legitimacy of a nation applying its laws to redress local
harms.").
386 See infta Part III.C.
387 See Tushnet, supra note 373, at 1003.
388 But see BOLLINGER, supra note 4, at 116-19 (encouraging Supreme Court to
advance cause of free press in global forum).
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Extraterritoriality and the Negative First Amendment

As noted earlier, there is strong textual, theoretical, and precedential support for extraterritorial application of First Amendment
expressive guarantees to citizens (and perhaps legal resident aliens)
located abroad.3 8 9 Although no court has expressly held as much, at
least in this respect the First Amendment's negative proscriptions
ought to apply without regard to territoriality. As noted earlier, the
more difficult question is whether the First Amendment's domain
might actually be more universal or global, insofar as its negative
prohibitions may apply to aliens located abroad. Although there is
some precedential support for such an expansion, there are also some
substantive and theoretical obstacles that must be overcome if the territorial reach of the First Amendment is to be expanded in this sense.
a. First Amendment Functionality
As noted earlier, Boumediene clearly adopts a functional methodology for determining whether habeas corpus applies extraterritorially. As Gerald Neuman has observed, however, the decision leaves
many questions unanswered. 3 90 One of the most important of these
unresolved issues relates to the territorial scope of constitutional liberties other than the writ, in particular those set forth in the First
Amendment and other Bill of Rights provisions.
The only non-immigration decision to consider in any depth
whether the First Amendment's free speech guarantee applies to
aliens abroad was decided prior to both Verdugo-Urquidez and
Boumediene. As noted earlier, in DKT Memorial Fund the D.C. Circuit
held that aliens located abroad lacked prudential standing to challenge U.S. funding restrictions on foreign speech.3 9 '
In a post- Verdugo-Urquidez case, Lamont v. Woods,392 the Second
Circuit addressed whether the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause applied to what it referred to as "governmental activities having
extraterritorial dimensions."3 9 3 In Lamont, federal taxpayers challenged the appropriation and expenditure of public funds for the
construction, maintenance, and operation of religious schools
389 See supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
390 See Neuman, supra note 308, at 286-87.
391 See DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 285 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (holding that aliens lacked prudential standing to bring First Amendment
claims).
392 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991).
393 Id. at 834.
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abroad. 3 94 Using Verdugo-Urquidez as an analytical framework, the
court held that the Establishment Clause "should apply
extraterritorially."3 9 5
The court concluded that the challenged funding decisions
occurred in the United States.3 96 Still, the court held that the expenditure of tax dollars for support of religious schools offended the Establishment Clause "regardless of the physical situs of those institutions
or activities."s9 7 It concluded that "general principles of Establishment Clause jurisprudence provide no basis for distinguishing
between foreign and domestic establishments of religion."3 9 8 According to Lamont, the Establishment Clause limited governmental power
abroad because its proscription attached to funds being spent by
aliens overseas.3 99 The court was quick to note, however, that aliens
would not be entitled to challenge either a grant or denial of aid. 400 It
also noted that "the foreign policy ramifications of applying the Establishment Clause to [the subject grants] will be minimal."4 0 1
Lamont provides only limited support for extending First Amendment speech, press, and association protections to aliens beyond U.S.
borders. Again, the actual governmental conduct in Lamont occurred
inside the United States and the benefits of the Establishment Clause
accrued only to domestic U.S. taxpayers. Moreover, the history of
extraterritorial application, the nature of establishment itself, and the
policies underlying the Establishment Clause do not necessarily
extend to speech and other First Amendment liberties. Still, Lamont
provides a functional framework for assessing the extraterritoriality of
First Amendment guarantees that is more consistent with modern
precedents than the decision in DKT Memoial Fund, which dismissed
the First Amendment claims of foreign grant applicants largely on the
basis of the immigration exclusion precedents. 402
394 Id. at 828.
395 Id. at 835.
396 Id. at 834. The court concluded that historical evidence that the Establishment Clause applied in U.S. territories suggested that the prohibition applied extraterritorially. See id. at 838. But application in U.S. territories speaks only to the
intraterritorialFirst Amendment, not to whether the Establishment Clause applies in
territories abroad.
397 Id. at 839.
398 Id. at 840.
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Id. at 841.
402 See supra notes 321-26 and accompanying text.
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Boumediene rejects the bright-line distinction between citizens and
aliens set forth in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez.4 03
But the Boumediene decision is itself territorial, in the sense that it
turns substantially on U.S. control over the territory at issue-Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. At a minimum, however, the Court's functional
approach supports extraterritorial application of First Amendment
speech and association guarantees in the case of aliens held in U.S.
custody or within territory under U.S. control. Thus, the First Amendment would arguably apply were U.S. officials to abduct, detain, and
prosecute alien critics of U.S. foreign policy in certain locations
abroad or inside the United States. 4 0 4
There is still the question of degree of application, however. As
Gerald Neuman has observed, the extent of First Amendment protection abroad may depend on such factors as "where the speech
originated, where its intended audience was, and the location of
detention and trial." 405 Substantive questions also abound. Does the
prior restraint doctrine apply? Is the government generally prohibited in the foreign context from basing decisions on content or viewpoint? Can alien detainees or "enemy combatants" raise First
Amendment defenses?
There will clearly be limits to the First Amendment's extraterritorial domain. Neuman posits, for example, that "First Amendment
equality principles would not give nationals of countries where the
United States subsidizes a pro-American political party a legal basis for
objection," even though such biased funding would implicate the First
Amendment within the United States. 406 Nor, presumably, would foreign nationals have a right to challenge U.S. propaganda activities,
even if they would be illegal if conducted in the United States. 4 0 7 Similarly, Boumediene's functional approach would not seem to lend any
403 See Neuman, supranote 308, at 272 ("Boumediene provides a long overdue repudiation of Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquide... .").
404 Id. at 287.
405 Id.; see also id. at 288 ("[T]he functional approach does not present a binary
choice between nonapplication of a constitutional right and application of the right
precisely as it operates in an analogous domestic setting."). The mutuality of obligation approach would also counsel in favor of application of the First Amendment in
this context. See Neuman, supra note 316, at 2083.
406 Neuman, supra note 308, at 287.
407 SeeJeff Gerth, Militaiy's Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2005, at I (describing various aspects of a broad "information war" being
conducted in various parts of the world). Domestic limits on government propagandizing are rather hazy. They reside principally in appropriations laws that forbid
agencies from using federal funds for propaganda purposes. See KEVIN R. KOSAR,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIc RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA 4-5 (2005), available at
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support to aliens' free speech and association challenges to U.S. funding conditions that restrict speech and association abroad-unless,
perhaps, as in Lamont the court was to view the funding decisions as
having occurred within the United States. There may also be practical
obstacles to enforcement of First Amendment rights abroad, including diplomatic complications and international differences with
regard to substantive speech protections. 408 Finally, it is not clear
whether alien-to-alien communications that take place in foreign territories would be subject to any First Amendment protection at all. 409
In sum, under existing precedents any extension of the First
Amendment's territorial domain is likely to be rather minimal and
incomplete. This is due, in large part, to the uncertainties attending
Boumediene's functional and practical standard. Whenever practical
necessities weigh in the balance, predictions obviously become more
difficult. We can say that in certain limited contexts the First Amendment likely follows the flag to some foreign territories; we just cannot
say for certain whether or to what extent it might catch up to it.
b.

Extraterritoriality and First Amendment Justifications

There is an additional, and in some sense antecedent, obstacle to
expansion of First Amendment protections to speakers and audiences
located abroad. Because the First Amendment has been treated primarily as a domestic concern, little attention has been paid to justifications for extraterritorial application. If the First Amendment's
territorial domain is to be expanded, the extension must be accompanied (or perhaps preceded) by an adequate theory or justification.
This point actually applies to cross-border information exchange generally; but it is particularly important in terms of expansion of the
First Amendment's negative liberties. In short, expansion of the First
Amendment's domain abroad must be preceded by more careful consideration of the relationship between the First Amendment and foreign speakers and audiences.
As noted earlier, traditional justifications for free speech include
facilitating self-governance, the search for truth, and self-actualization. 4 10 The justifications for protecting free speech may differ
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32750.pdf (describing legal limits on agency
propagandizing).
408 Neuman, supra note 308, at 288.
409 See Roosevelt, supra note 312, at 2066 (expressing doubt that alien-to-alien
communications abroad serve either the democratic or the self-actualization purpose
underlying the First Amendment).
410 See supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text.
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depending on whether the speaker, the audience, or both are located
within or outside U.S. territory.4 1 I Thus, we must first differentiate
among five basic categories of speakers and audiences: (1) both
speaker and audience are domestic; (2) the speaker is foreign and the
audience domestic; (3) the speaker is domestic and the audience foreign; (4) the speaker is domestic and the audience is mixed (i.e., both
domestic and foreign); and (5) both speaker and audience are
foreign .412
We may easily dispense with Category 1, which does not raise any
issues of extraterritorial application. Category 2 involves the First
Amendment right of U.S. listeners to receive foreign speech. As
noted in Part I, the Supreme Court has recognized this right in the
context of attempted bans on the entry of visiting scholars and other
alien speakers. It has held that the domestic audience has a right to
receive the speech in person, subject to any reasonable and bona fide
43
justifications for denial of entry. ' This right presumably extends to
receipt of foreign expression and ideas more generally.4 1 4 Of course,
this does not mean that import restrictions and even outright territorial barriers regarding certain materials cannot be justified. It means
only that the government must justify such bans in light of First
Amendment concerns. Although the Court itself has not explained
the justification for the right to receive foreign speech, it may plausibly be considered either critical to the search for truth, on the understanding that the marketplace of ideas is not territorially confined to
the United States, or as an aspect of citizens' interest in self-governance-i.e., in hearing for themselves what foreign speakers have to
say, particularly, but not exclusively, about matters of public concern.
Categories 3 and 4 relate directly to the various import and
export restrictions discussed in Part I. Given that an increasing
amount of communication from domestic speakers to foreign audiences will occur via the Internet, in many cases it will not be possible
to distinguish between domestic and foreign audiences. Hence the
411 They may also differ depending on the content of the speech. Political discourse, for example, tends to receive greater First Amendment consideration than
commercial speech and other nonpolitical discourse. Here, however, I am primarily
concerned with the territorial reach or domain of traditional First Amendment justifications or theories, rather than the results in any particular context.
412 The permutations are actually more numerous and complex. For example, a
foreign audience might be composed of both aliens and citizens. For purposes of the
present discussion, however, the five basic categories will suffice.
413 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
414 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (recognizing a right
to receive foreign communist propaganda).
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audiences will be "mixed."4 15 Thus, some Category 1 justifications will
be present in these situations. In that event, traditional First Amendmentjustifications may support some protection for at least the purely
domestic component of the expression. 4 1 6
But suppose the audience the domestic speaker wishes to reach is
composed solely of foreign listeners or recipients (Category 3).
Addressing only the narrow but (as shown in Part I) important category of scientific and technical expression, Robert Kamenshine has
argued that "generally cited first amendment values have little or no
application" to this scenario. 4 17 He claims that even assuming the subject of the communication is foreign policy, "[n]o first amendment
self-governance interest exists in informing foreign nationals on the
41
Similarly, Kamenshine argues that "[a]ssisting foreign
debate."1
nationals to find truth .

.

. is not a first amendment goal."4 19 That is

so, he says, "unless we internationalize our concept of the first amendment. "420 Kamenshine also dismisses any self-fulfillment rationale for
protecting speech to foreign audiences. Even assuming that a domestic speaker has an interest in self-fulfillment in Category 3, Kamenshine claims that "no United States constitutional interest arises in
fostering the self-fulfillment of a foreign citizen." 42 ' For this and
other reasons, he finds the self-fulfillment rationale substantially
wanting. 4 22
In sum, at least with regard to scientific and technical expression
Kamenshine argues that traditional First Amendment theories orjustifications-self-governance, the search for truth, and self-fulfillmentdo not apply to domestic speech communicated solely to foreign audiences. But Kamenshine's position seems to apply more broadly to
speech with foreign audiences, regardless of content. In general, he
states: "We are not constitutionally committed to facilitating [First
Amendment] objectives abroad."4 2 3
415 See Kamenshine, supra note 1, at 873-75 (discussing First Amendmentjustifications in the context of mixed audiences).
416 Id.
417 Id. at 866.
418 Id. at 867.
419 Id. at 868.
420 Id. (emphasis added).
421 Id. at 873. He claims that the case for protection is particularly weak when the
domestic speaker is a corporation. Id. at 869.
422 Kamenshine claims that the pure self-fulfillment scenario is quite rare, given
the breadth of the self-democracy and marketplace justifications. Id. at 871. He also
notes that the Supreme Court has never indicated how much weight ought to be
given to pure self-actualization in free speech cases. Id.
423 Id. at 869.
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Kamenshine's analysis predates globalization, digitization, the
softening of U.S. borders, and the jurisprudential ascendance of the
functional approach to constitutional domain. But it remains perhaps
the most careful analysis of the territorial dimension of First Amendment justifications. Other commentators have agreed with Kamenshine's principal claim that First Amendment justifications do not
apply to speech with foreign audiences or to alien-to-alien
communications. 424
In contrast, however, some courts have stated that the First
Amendment protects cross-border communications with foreign audiences. 425 Moreover, First Amendment scrutiny was applied to some of
the export controls discussed in Part I even though the recipients or
audiences were solely foreign. 426 As discussed earlier, U.S. borders
were softened in part owing to judicial recognition that the First
Amendment applies to cross-border communications. But neither
commentators nor courts have provided any real justification, with
regard to Category 3 situations, for either a territorial or more global
approach. This theoretical gap is a significant obstacle to expansion
of the First Amendment's territorial domain.
Recent debate has centered on Category 5, which involves speech
solely among foreigner speakers and audiences (alien-to-alien
speech). Kermit Roosevelt claims that while the self-governance theory might justify granting some First Amendment protection to communications between foreign speakers and domestic audiences
424 Several commentators who have addressed the recognition and enforcement
of foreign libel judgments appear to take the position that the traditional justifications for the First Amendment apply only to domestic speakers' communications to
domestic audiences. See Derek Devgun, United States Enforcement of English Defamation
Judgments: Exporting the First Amendment?, 23 ANGLo-AM. L. REV. 195, 203 (1994);
Sharon E. Foster, Does the FirstAmendment Restrict Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Copyright Judgments and Arbitration Awards?, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 361, 390 (1998);
Jeremy Maltby, Note, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement of ForeignLibel
judgments in US. Courts, 94 COLum. L. REV. 1978, 2007 n.160 (1994); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42JURIMETRICSJ. 261, 267 (2002). But
see Van Houweling, supra note 251, at 714 ("The First Amendment should protect
speech to foreign audiences even if the amendment is concerned primarily with
domestic self-government.").
425 See, e.g., DKT Mem'l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 295 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (recognizing "the right of Americans to maintain First Amendment relationships with foreigners"); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 509 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1988) (indicating approval of the district court's holding that the First Amendment protects communications with foreign audiences).
426 See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (subjecting export
restrictions to First Amendment scrutiny); Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1,
9-12 (D.D.C. 1996) (same).
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(Category 2), it does not support application of the First Amendment
to purely foreign communications. 42 7 As well, echoing Kamenshine,
Roosevelt observes that "it is hard to see why the Constitution would
be concerned with the self-actualization of aliens abroad." 4 28
Gerald Neuman agrees that the U.S. government has no obligation to facilitate self-actualization abroad. But, he asks, "[I]s it so clear
that no First Amendment concerns are raised when the government
reaches out to crush aliens' self-actualization abroad?"4 2 9 Neuman
objects to Roosevelt's position in part on the ground that accepting it
"exposes [nonresident aliens] to whatever prohibitions Congress
decides to enact."43 0 Certainly, he argues, if the United States were to
enact and enforce a criminal law banning aliens' broadcast of certain
videos or prohibiting espousal of certain ideas and sought to enforce
such a law domestically, the First Amendment would apply. 43 1 He suggests it may also apply to prosecutions conducted outside U.S. borders. 4 3 2 In sum, it is a close question whether, even in Category 5
cases, there might be some justification for applying First Amendment
restrictions.
A strict territorial approach seems out of step with the changes in
the relationship between territory and the First Amendment discussed
in this Article. Exemptions for "informational materials," prohibitions
on ideological decisionmaking at the border, liberalization of travel
restrictions, and prohibitions on viewpoint-based discrimination in
customs laws and regulations are all obviously related to First Amendment concerns. Indeed, a prominent goal of liberalization and deterritorialization is to facilitate associations and communications with
foreign speakers and audiences.
Moreover, courts and legislatures often appear to ascribe to a
nonterritorial view of the First Amendment's justificatory domain. As
noted, the First Amendment presumptively applies to citizens who
travel abroad to communicate with foreign audiences. As noted,
many courts have proceeded on the assumption that communications
with foreign audiences are subject to the same or similar protection as
those with domestic recipients. With regard to enforcement of foreign libel judgments, courts have expressed concern over the possibility that communications with foreign audiences will be chilled.
Finally, the intent of proposals such as the Global Online Freedom
427
428
429
430
431
432

Roosevelt, supra note 312, at 2066.
Id.
Neuman, supra note 316, at 2082.
Id.
Id. at 2082-83.
Id. at 2083.
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Act is to advance freedom of information solely among nonresident
aliens-a pure Category 5 context. It is not so clear, then, that First
Amendment justifications have no extraterritorial weight or
application.
Certainly traditional First Amendment theories-self-governance,
the search for truth, and self-actualization-were designed for domestic purposes and with domestic speech in mind. But the globalized
world is some distance removed from Meiklejohn's model "town hall"
meeting.4 3 3 There is not adequate space in this Article to fully
develop a plausible theoretical account that mightjustify expansion of
the territorial domain of First Amendment guarantees. I will focus
here on but one salient effort, namely the "democratic culture" theory
articulated by Jack Balkin. 4 3 4 Balkin does not expressly claim that his
theory applies in foreign contexts. But I believe it is broad enough to
encompass some cross-border and extraterritorial concerns.
Balkin's central point is this: "The digital age provides a technological infrastructure that greatly expands the possibilities for individual participation in the growth and spread of culture and thus greatly
expands the possibilities for the realization of a truly democratic culture."4 3 5 He does not indicate where this "democratic culture" exists,
or might exist.43 6 But Balkin's focus on new technologies of communication and the diverse cultures they create suggests that his
approach may be universally applicable. As Balkin states: "Like
democracy itself, democratic culture exists in different societies in
varying degrees; it is also an ideal toward which a society might
strive." 4 3 7 Freedom of speech, Balkin notes, "protects the ability of
individuals to participate in the culture in which they live and promotes
the development of a culture that is more democratic and participatory." 4 3 8 Balkin's focus on appropriation of materials and cooperation among speakers in geographically distinct societies-what he
calls "glomming on"-also suggests an expansive conception of the

433 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITIcAL FREEDOM 25-27 (1960) (invoking town
hall metaphor to explain the theory of democratic self-government).
434 SeeJack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33-45 (2004).
435 Id. at 6.
436 Balkin does note, however, that the digital revolution makes it easier to cross
cultural and national boundaries, and thus to "interact with and form new communities of interest with people around the globe." Id. at 7-8.
437 Id. at 4.
438 Id. (emphasis added).
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expressive community with which the First Amendment is
concerned. 4 39
To be clear, I make no claim that Balkin's theory presents a
wholly satisfactory justification for expansion of the First Amendment's territorial domain. It does suggest, however, that a narrow
focus on the more traditional First Amendment justifications may
obscure more contemporary justifications for protecting speech
outside U.S. territorial borders. 440 On this view, opening our borders
to facilitate the free flow of information does not necessarily have to
be about citizens' self-governance or self-fulfillment (although these
may also be viable justifications). Rather, the justification under a theory that better fits our digitized and globalized world may be that
moderating border restrictions or applying the First Amendment even
to alien-to-alien communications will lead to the spread of democratic
cultures regardless of location. A more contemporary First Amendment
theory like Balkin's suggests that laws that interfere with cross-cultural
exchange or suppress participation in creating a democratic culture
may be inherently suspect under the First Amendment.
At present, however, we do not have a full-blown justification for
extending the First Amendment's domain to alien speakers and audiences abroad. If there is to be a further expansion of the First Amendment's extraterritorial domain, this theoretical gap will obviously have
to be filled.
C.

The TransnationalFirst Amendment

Finally, there is one other important sense in which our First
Amendment may become less territorial and more cosmopolitan. As
noted earlier, exportation of the First Amendment will generally
occur as a result of international negotiations rather than domestic
decrees. In a globalized world, the laws of many nations may have
extraterritorial effect or influence. As has long been the case, the
First Amendment will have to compete with other speech regimes for
territorial influence. Thus far, I have discussed de-territorialization as
a liberalizing force that will facilitate cross-border and perhaps even
purely foreign expression. But de-territorialization may push in the
opposite direction. Rather than exportation of the First Amendment,
the flattening of territorial borders may lead to the importation of
foreign speech standards and principles.
439 See id. at 10-11.
440 SeeJack M. Balkin, The Futureof Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
427, 438-39 (2009) (arguing that the self-government justification is too narrow in a
digital age in which expression transcends the nation-state).
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Importation of foreign speech regimes may occur in a variety of
ways. As the Yahoo! case suggests, foreign courts may seek to apply
foreign speech laws extraterritorially. More generally, processes and
mechanisms associated with transnationalism, including multinational
treaties that establish global speech standards, may pose some threat
to First Amendment protections currently available within U.S.
borders. 44 1
As Harold Koh has explained, a nationalist approach looks
inward and is characterized by a commitment to territoriality and
resistance to international law and process as meaningful constraints
on domestic authority. 4 4 2 A transnationalist approach, by contrast,
"assumes America's political and economic interdependence with
other nations operating within the international legal system." 4 4 3 The
transnationalist accepts that "one prominent feature of a globalizing
world is the emergence of a transnational law, particularly in the area
of human rights, that merges the national and the international."4 4 4
Koh has described a "transnational legal process" in which "domestic
systems incorporate international rules into domestic law through a
three-part process of interaction, interpretation, and norm
internalization."445
Debates concerning transnationalism encompass some very
broad themes, including the role of state sovereignty in an increasingly globalized world. Transnationalism touches upon everything
from U.S. participation in international criminal tribunals, to citation
of foreign authority by domestic courts. 446 Insofar as the First Amendment is concerned, the debate centers more narrowly on whether
441 For an elaboration of transnational legal process, see Harold Hongju Koh,
How Is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74 INo. L.J. 1397, 1399-1408 (1999);
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1501-03
(2003).
442 See Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
43, 53-54 (2004) (explaining aspects of "transnationalist jurisprudence").
443 Id. at 53.
444 Id.
445

Id. at 55; see supra note 441.

446 On citation of foreign authority, see Roger P. Alford, Misusing International
Sources to Interpret the Constitution,98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, ConstitutionalComparisons: Convergence, Resistance,Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005);
Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespectingthe "Opinionsof Mankind": InternationalLaw in ConstitutionalInterpretation,8 GREEN BAG 2d 261 (2005); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad
when Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 353 (2004);
Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More? Unpackingthe Controversy
over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006); Ernest A.
Young, Foreign Law and the DenominatorProblem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005).
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international speech norms and rules will ultimately disregard U.S.
territorial boundaries. The specific concern is that transnational
processes may displace what has long been exceptional American tolerance for certain types of expression. 4 4 7 A transnational First
Amendment would offer less protection for hate speech, expressions
of religious and perhaps other forms of bigotry, commercial speech,
and libelous speech. It would offer greater protection to equality and
dignity interests, as is the case in other constitutional democracies. 448
Transnational processes have already altered domestic speech
policies in certain respects. Several laws and regulations discussed in
Part I were moderated in response to the 1975 Helsinki Accords," 9
which required greater freedom of movement across national borders
for people and ideas. 450 For example, the Moynihan-Frank Amendment prohibited the exclusion or deportation of any alien for her
political beliefs or for any actions that, if engaged in by a U.S. citizen,
would be protected by the First Amendment.4 5 ' In this and other
instances, international processes played some part in softening U.S.
territorial borders.
Of course, moderating the territorial First Amendment is not the
same as altering longstanding domestic standards regarding hate
speech, incitement, libel, and commercial speech. By what mechanisms might international norms and standards be imported? What is
the likelihood that they will actually come to govern domestic speech
liberties?
The most direct mechanism for importing foreign speech norms
and standards to the United States would be via treaty or other international agreement. The historical understanding is that treaties cannot override individual rights. 4 5 2 But in a globalized world, even this
longstanding proposition has been contested. Peter Spiro has argued
that with respect to some norms, "a case can be made for the international determination of baseline rights."45 3 Spiro challenges what he
447 With respect to America's free speech exceptionalism, see generally Frederick
Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHi-rs 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).

448 Tushnet, supra note 373, at 1003.
449 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M.
1292.
450 See SASSEN, supra note 341, at 68.
451 Id. at 68-69; see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
452 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (plurality opinion) (asserting that
in exercising power under an international agreement the United States must observe
the Constitution's prohibitions).
453 Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, InternationalLaw, and ConstitutionalRights, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 1999, 2001 (2003).
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calls the "doctrine of constitutional hegemony"-the notion that constitutional rights have always prevailed over treaty obligations. 45 4
Although he acknowledges that a consensus still exists among U.S.
policymakers and judges that treaties cannot override constitutional
rights, Spiro claims that constitutional hegemony is less categorical
than often assumed. 4 5 5 He asserts, for example, that where a treaty
provision conflicts with domestic constitutional liberties, courts are
likely to modify constitutional doctrine rather than invalidate the
treaty. 456
With specific regard to the First Amendment, Spiro cites Boos v.
Barry,4 5 7 in which the Supreme Court struck down a law limiting protests within a certain distance of foreign embassies in Washington,
D.C. 45 8 The Boos Court merely suggested that compliance with international law could be recognized as a compelling interest supporting
the measure and that "the dictates of international law [might]
require that First Amendment analysis be adjusted to accommodate
the interests of foreign officials." 459 If this were the case, the First
Amendment would be interpreted to conform to the treaty, rather
than the other way around. In that event, Spiro claims that America
might be "ceding rights autonomy." 46 0
Spiro also provides a normative argument for subordinating
domestic constitutional rights to treaty and other international obligations. Rather than achieve this through something like transnational
legal process, Spiro points to the treaty power itself as the instrument
of subordination. 46 1 He argues that in a world in which international
human rights are being constitutionalized, and in which territorial
borders and national institutions "do not necessarily enjoy normative
foundations," there is no a priori reason for privileging domestic constitutional norms over international ones. 46 2 Spiro concludes that in
this environment, "an international norm against hate speech would
supply a basis for prohibiting it, the First Amendment
notwithstanding. "463
454 Id. at 2017-27.
455 See id. at 2017-18.
456 See id. at 2019 (discussing the Chemical Weapons Convention and Fourth
Amendment concerns).
457 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
458 See id. at 315, 329; Spiro, supra note 453, at 2019-20 (discussing Boos).
459 See Boos, 485 U.S. at 324.
460 Spiro, supra note 453, at 2020-22.
461 See id. at 2021-22.
462 Id. at 2022-23.
463 Id. at 2025.
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These are, of course, fighting words to nationalists and territorialists. "Ceding rights autonomy" may be code for ceding territorial sovereignty itself. But there are several reasons why domestic-rightssubordinating treaty provisions and judicial pronouncements establishing a transnational First Amendment are not likely to materialize.
First, as even Spiro concedes, "[i] t is unlikely in the extreme that
... treatymakers would undertake such a frontal assault against the
supremacy of constitutional rights." 4 6 4 He notes that "it would take a
constitutional moment of the highest order to overcome the
supremacy norm." 465 The United States has proven time and again
that Spiro's intuition is well founded. It has consistently rejected, or
qualified its participation in, treaties and international agreements
that threaten to depart from domestic speech norms. 46 6 As Spiro
points out, the United States has been quite content to risk incurring
economic or other costs from its refusal to subordinate domestic
speech norms.46 7
Second, notwithstanding the willingness of some U.S. judges to
engage foreign authority in resolving certain domestic constitutional
issues, courts in particular would not seem to be very likely sources of
constitutional rights subordination. Domestic courts are inclined to
468
interpret human rights provisions in treaties as non-self-executing.
Moreover, the Boos example does not signal any broad movement
toward an international or transnational First Amendment. It is one
thing to express concern for the safety of foreign diplomats on U.S.
soil in the face of public protests. It is quite another for a U.S. court
to subordinate the law of libel, incitement, and other substantive
69
Boos
speech doctrines to some supposed international consensus.4
464 Id.
465 Id.
466 See id. at 2018 (discussing, as an example, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which requires parties to prohibit so-called "hate speech"); see
also Neil MacFarquhar, Concerns Keep U.S. from Talks on Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2009, at A7 (noting that the United States declined to participate in a conference
owing to concerns regarding proposed condemnation of expressions of religious
bigotry).
467 See Spiro, supra note 453, at 2018, 2020-21.
468 See Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and InternationalHuman Rights, 83 Am. J.
INT'L L. 851, 855 (1989) (discussing the United States' avoidance of human rights
provisions).
469 In situations in which the Supreme Court has recently alluded to foreign
precedents and practices to inform its constitutional decisions, it has reached for foreign sources in part because the history and tradition with respect to the relevant
norm was arguably uncertain. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21
(2002) (referring to the opinion of the "world community" in assessing whether exe-
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does not come close to supporting that degree of cession or subordination. Further, as we have seen, U.S. courts have almost uniformly
refused to enforce foreign libel judgments obtained under laws contrary to the First Amendment-notwithstanding the fact that this
ignores established rules relating to foreign judgment recognition
and, in some cases, the strong interests of other nations.
Third, the internationalism or transnationalism approaches
incorrectly assume that some global consensus on speech norms can
be readily discovered, or already exists, even among comparable constitutional democracies. Contrary to the wishes of Internet exceptionalists, who long for a single speech standard for Internet
communications, and transnationalists, who seek uniform human
rights standards, speech norms remain diverse. 4 70 As Saskia Sassen
has noted, even in a global era "[t] here is no global law."4 7 1 We ought
not to forget that the U.S. has tried, and failed, to export the First
Amendment to nations that embrace different values with respect to
freedom of information. 4 72
Fourth, and finally, there is a rather curious assumption that
internationalism will automatically result in the subordination of U.S.
speech norms. As Sassen has pointed out, however, transnationalism
and internationalism have generally been a form of Americanizationin
areas ranging from environmental protection to human rights.4 7 3
Indeed, despite the recent citation of foreign authorities in U.S. judicial processes, the flow of constitutional norms, including First
Amendment norms, has generally favored U.S. expansionism rather
than transnationalism. 474 Thus, for example, international and transnational processes may ultimately result in the subordination or liberalization of British libel standards rather than diminished protection
for false statements of fact inside the United States.
cution of mentally retarded persons comports with evolving standards of decency).
That is certainly not the case with regard to core free speech standards and principles,
which have a long domestic pedigree. It is hard to imagine, for example, that the
Court (or any legislature) could ever be persuaded to subordinate New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan to foreign libel norms.
470 See generally KROTOSZYNSIU, supranote 374 (comparing how values such as militant democracy, culture, community, and a limited constitution shape speech norms
in the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom).
471 SASSEN, supra note 341, at 17.
472 See generally BLANcHARD, supra note 266 (describing unsuccessful efforts at the
United Nations to export First Amendment free press principles).
473 SASSEN, supta note 341, at 18.
474 See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the Ameican Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 537, 552-58 (1988) (discussing "overseas trade in American first amendment
values").
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None of these points refutes the argument that transnationalism
and internationalism could affect domestic speech rights in some
respects. As already mentioned, U.S. borders have been liberalized in
part as a result of international accords and agreements. As Boos
shows, a certain minimal respect for international law may lead to
some consideration of foreign interests in speech cases. But at this
point, any alarmism over invading foreign speech norms, the Europeanization of the First Amendment, and loss of constitutional sovereignty seems unwarranted. As in other respects, through the lenses of
internationalism and transnationalism, the First Amendment appears
less territorial. But America's domestic free speech exceptionalism is
not in any imminent danger of being subordinated to international or
transnational norms.47 5
CONCLUSION

Far too little attention has been paid to the First Amendment's
territorial dimension. The relationship between territorial borders
and the First Amendment is complex. It has changed dramatically
during the past few decades. Whether one is speaking of persons or
materials, crossing the border remains a significant First Amendment
event. A territorial framework, elements of which have been in place
since the founding of the nation, continues to restrict cross-border
movement and information exchange to some extent. But our First
Amendment is more cosmopolitan today than perhaps any other time
in the nation's history. Speech, press, and associational liberties are
far less territorially constrained. Legal and regulatory liberalization,
combined with modernizing forces such as globalization and digitization, have pulled back the "nylon curtain" that once served as a hard
content and ideological barrier at the nation's borders. The gradual
softening of U.S. borders has opened new markets for information
exchange, decreased reliance on ideological exclusion, and facilitated
cross-border expression and association. Regulatory de-territorialization of the First Amendment has not resulted in a loss of U.S. sovereignty, nor has it threatened our domestic security.
Globalization and digitization have flattened territorial borders in
other respects as well. Regulatory laws and constitutional liberties
increasingly extend beyond territorial borders. This form of de-territorialization has raised fundamental questions about the character
475 Transnationalism would not likely result in any complete subordination in any
event. It is more likely that transnational processes may lead to some convergence of
First Amendment norms, rather than wholesale displacement. See Tushnet, supra
note 373, at 987 ("[G]lobalization does not entail uniformity.").
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and dimension of First Amendment liberties. Is the First Amendment
a domestic regime that benefits only citizens and legal resident aliens
inside the United States? Or is it more akin to a universal human
right? U.S. laws, policies, and precedents do not provide consistent
answers to these questions. Efforts to export First Amendment norms,
standards, and principles abroad suggest a more cosmopolitan conception of the First Amendment. On the other hand, some courts
and scholars continue to resist the conclusion that the negative conception of the First Amendment fully constrains U.S. officials regardless of location.
Regardless of the position one takes on the proper dimensions of
the extraterritorial First Amendment, it is clear that efforts to export
the First Amendment by legislative fiat or judicial decree will be significantly hampered by diplomatic, international, political, jurisdictional,
and theoretical limitations. De-territorialization has increased global
competition among free speech regimes. In the future, some of the
most important questions pertaining to the First Amendment's scope
are likely to involve jurisdictional or conflicts of laws issues. 4 76 Moreover, the First Amendment's territorial fate rests partly upon the formulation of a theory orjustification for its extraterritorial application. As
well, in the international marketplace of free speech regimes the First
Amendment will compete against foreign speech standards that may
be imported as a result of internationalism or transnationalism. For
now, at least, the First Amendment's intraterritorial exclusivity seems
secure. But global competition will force the United States to reflect
further upon, and be prepared to defend, its exceptional speech
regime.

476 See generally Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.
REv. 311 (2002) (advocating a "cosmopolitan conception ofjurisdiction"); Paul Schiff
Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining GovernmentalInterests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1819 (2005) (advocating a more cosmopolitan
approach to choice of law).

